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THE POTENTIAL RIGHT OF CHRONICALLY ILL
ADOLESCENTS TO REFUSE LIFE-SAVING
MEDICAL TREATMENT-FATAL MISUSE OF
THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
A court's consideration of whether to legally sanction an adoles-
cent's1 refusal of life-saving medical treatment2 necessarily involves
balancing significant ethical interests. On one side of the scale is the
interest of the chronically ill adolescent who feels he or she cannot
tolerate another day of illness and/or treatment.3 On the other side is
1. The term "adolescence" is defined as "[tlhat age which follows puberty and precedes the
age of majority." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990). Taken at face value, the diction-
ary definition provides a certain and measurable upper boundary of adolescence-a legislative
designation of a chronological age. This author suggests, however, that adolescence is not so
simplistic a concept. For more than two decades, psychologists and sociologists have generally
recognized adolescents as a unique group of persons in our society. See FRANKUN E. ZIMRING,
THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE at xi (1982). They have acknowledged that
while "the beginning of adolescence can be set quite accurately (as it is defined by the specific
physiological criterion of sexual maturity), the terminal point of adolescence can only be approx-
imated, for there is no sharp differentiation between adolescence and adulthood." DAVID
KRECH ET AL., ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 70 (2d ed. 1969). Legal doctrine has not yet been
aligned with scientific data. As one commentator explains, "law and social science have been
talking past each other on issues relating to adolescence for quite some time ... [and] legal
doctrines relating to adolescence frequently appear strained and are susceptible to gross misin-
terpretation." ZIMRING, supra, at xiii. This Comment illustrates Professor Zimring's observa-
tions by exploring the law's response to adolescents who refuse life-saving medical treatment.
2. This Comment primarily addresses the issues implicated when adolescents refuse "life-sav-
ing," not "life-sustaining," medical treatment. Refusal of life-saving treatment involves refusal
of curative treatment, thus creating a "life or death" situation. Lisa Anne Hawkins, Note, Living
Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1595 (1992). On the other hand, deci-
sions regarding the discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment involve a "quality of life" inquiry.
Id. at 1595-96. The term "necessary medical treatment" will be used interchangeably with "life-
saving medical treatment" throughout this Comment.
3. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Benny Agrelo, a two-
time liver transplant patient who refused to continue his immunosuppressant regimen because of
its debilitating side effects). Within the past several years, the media have reported stories simi-
lar to Benny's. One of the most publicized cases of adolescent noncompliance with life-saving
medical treatment involved 16-year-old cancer patient Billy Best. Billy ran away from home for
several weeks in October. 1994, with the intent of travelling from Massachusetts to California by
bus, because he could not cope with the hair loss, nausea and weakness from twice-monthly
chemotherapy. John Ritter, Mass. Teen on the Run-from Chemotherapy, USA TODAY, Nov.
11, 1994, at 8A. In a note he left in his bedroom before leaving town, Billy explained, "The
reason I left is because I could not stand going to the hospital every week .... I feel like the
medicine is killing me instead of helping me." Morose, Boy with Cancer Runs Away, CH. TRaI.,
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the interest of society in preserving the adolescent's life.4 Regardless
of how the scale of ethics may tip, courts have historically refused to
indulge in any sort of balancing of interests and have uniformly for-
bidden minors from making such weighty decisions for themselves.5
Common law holds that any person under the age of majority is a
minor 6 and is legally incapable of rendering or withholding consent
for medical treatment. 7 The minor's intolerance for his or her illness
and/or treatment is not legally relevant.
Recently, however, courts have begun to deviate from the common
law maxim in order to allow certain chronically ill minors to discon-
tinue necessary medical treatment.8 The tool utilized by courts is the
"mature minor doctrine," which permits a minor who exhibits the
"maturity" of an adult to make decisions that traditionally have been
reserved for persons who have attained the age of majority. 9 One
Nov. 4, 1994, § 1, at 26. The news magazine television show Dateline, in a January, 1995 broad-
cast, reported the stories of several other chronically ill adolescents who have refused life-saving
medical treatment because of intolerable side effects. Dateline (ABC television broadcast, Jan.
20, 1995).
4. This interest is best illustrated by the State's parens patriae power. "Parens patriae" is
defined as "the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves,
such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTION.
ARY at 1114. See In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. App. 1983) ("[l1t is well-settled that
the State as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors and, if necessary, make vital
decisions as to whether to submit a minor to necessary treatment where the condition is life
threatening, as wrenching and distasteful as such actions may be."). The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois also has stated that "[w]here the health care issues are potentially life threatening, the
State's parens patriae interest is greater than if the health care matter is less consequential." In
re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (II1. 1989).
5. See E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328 (Ward, J., dissenting) (referring to "the ancient responsibility of
the State as parens patriae to protect minors and to decide for them . . . vital questions, including
whether to consent to or refuse necessary medical treatment."); Dan W. Brock, Children's Com-
petence for Health Care Decisionmaking, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH CARE: MORAL AND SO-
CIAL ISSUES 181, 181 (Loretta M. Kopelman & John C. Moskop eds., 1989) ("The general
presumption then in legal policy is that adults are entitled to decide about their medical care
while children are not.").
6. A "minor" is "[an infant or person who is under the age of legal competence." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY at 997. The age of majority in all states is now 18. ANGELA R. HOLDER,
LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 129 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES].
7. See Brock, supra note 5, at 181 ("[T]he law presumes that minors.., are not competent to
decide about their medical care .... [T]he law generally holds that others, usually parents or
guardians, are to decide for them about their medical treatment."); Hawkins, supra note 2, at
1586 ("Traditional common law generally viewed minors as unable to make sound decisions
about medical treatment; thus, it vested consensual authority in the parents .... ).
8. See infra part I.C. (reviewing cases in which the mature minor doctrine has been invoked to
allow adolescents to discontinue necessary medical treatment).
9. See JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE
OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 43 (1986) (explaining that the mature minor doctrine holds
that "if a minor is of sufficient intelligence and maturity to understand and appreciate both the
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may initially interpret this phenomenon as an expansion of the rights
of minors, based upon judicial recognition that chronically ill adoles-
cents are (or may be) as mature as adults. 10 However, as this Com-
ment will demonstrate, "maturity" is not a well-defined legal term,1
and the mature minor doctrine is more an instrument of paternalism
than a conduit of liberty for adolescents.' 2 The doctrine is nonetheless
capable of effecting drastic consequences. This Comment will explore
the anomaly of adolescents being afforded the right to refuse life-sav-
ing medical treatment purportedly on the basis of their "maturity."
Such anomaly is aptly illustrated by the following case.
During the summer of 1994, fifteen-year-old Benny Agrelo, a two-
time liver transplant recipient residing in Florida, was given permis-
sion by a Broward County Juvenile Court judge to stop taking immu-
nosuppressant drugs necessary to sustain his life. 13 Benny had
previously discontinued his anti-rejection regimen because it caused
him to suffer debilitating headaches and severe irritability.' 4 When
Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services learned
that Benny had stopped taking his medication, Benny was forcibly
taken from his home on grounds of alleged medical neglect.15 At the
hospital, Benny refused to have a biopsy or blood tests performed or
to take any medication. 16 After four days, the judge vacated the
agency's detention order, and Benny was permitted to go home, dis-
continue treatment, and ultimately die.17
Benny's case, widely publicized in the popular press, has elicited
responses varying from supportive to outraged to bewildered.18 As
benefits and risks of the proposed medical or surgical treatment, then the minor may consent to
that treatment without parental consent. ); see also infra part I.B.4. (discussing the mature
minor doctrine generally).
10. Such an interpretation is suggested by the Illinois Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549
N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (I11. 989) ("If the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature
enough to .. . exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine affords her the
common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment.").
11. See infra part II.B. (analyzing the definitional shortcomings of the mature minor doctrine).
12. See infra part II.A. (positing that paternalism is a primary motivation for the mature mi-
nor doctrine).
13. Nancy San Martin, Suffering Ends for Brave Teen-Ager, ORLANDO SENTIMEL, August 21,
1994, at B7.
14. Id.
15. Tom Lassiter & Barbara Walsh, Liver Patient Urges Teen To Take Medicine, ORLANDO
SEnTINEL, June 15, 1994, at B6.
16. Christine Gorman, A Sick Boy Says "Enough!", TIME, June 27, 1994, at 65.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Amy Driscoll, Ailing Teen Struggles with Crush of Publicity, MIAMI HERALD,
June 16, 1994, at Al (reporting that before his death, Benny Agrelo was overwhelmed by phone
calls, letters, and gifts, and was being hounded to accept made-for-TV movie offers and maga-
zine and television interviews); Gorman, supra note 16, at 65 (quoting Dr. Andrew Klein, a liver-
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one author explains it, "Benny's story seems to be yet another case of
a patient asserting his right to die when medicine can only prolong
suffering. The twist is that Benny is still, in the eyes of the law, a child
who cannot make such weighty decisions on his own." 19 It is this
"twist" that grabs the attention of the critical legal mind. Benny's case
is not simply a quirk in the legal system; rather, it reflects a fusion of
highly complex legal and ethical issues that have not been sufficiently
explored by the courts. Whether Benny was forced to remain alive
and suffer the side effects of his medication or, as the case turned out,
permitted to die, society is uncomfortable with both alternatives.20
One cannot help but wonder whether Benny, as he matured into an
adult, would have better tolerated his physical pain and "outgrown"
his emotional anguish. It is this uncertainty, coupled with the novelty
of legally sanctioning a fifteen-year-old's resolution to die, that com-
mands the legal community to examine the soundness of this line of
legal decisions.
Ultimately, there is neither a legal nor ethical "answer" to the ques-
tion of whether a chronically ill minor-specifically an adolescent-
has the right to discontinue life-saving medical treatment. Nonethe-
less, Benny Agrelo's case, among others,21 seems to have blurred the
distinction between the rights of adults and minors to refuse life-sav-
ing medical treatment. Thus, it is imperative for the legal community
not only to be well-informed of the judicial doctrines that determine
the allocation of decision-making authority regarding adolescent
transplant specialist at Johns Hopkins Medical School: "Considering the severe shortage of or-
gan donors, I think there is a moral obligation to take care of the organ you receive as best you
can."). Dr. Klein explained, however, that preserving an organ should not be at the expense of
maintaining some "semblance of pleasure in life." Id.; Lassiter & Walsh, supra note 15 (quoting
a 61-year-old liver transplant patient who wished to persuade Benny Agrelo to continue taking
his medication and to tell him: "I know about the headaches you've had. It's not a good feeling.
It's discouraging, I know that. To tell you the truth, sometimes I felt like throwing in the
towel."); Melanie McFarland, Fresh Starts; Transplant Patients Don't Prescribe Ever Giving Up,
Cm. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1994, at 1 (quoting a 14-year-old kidney transplant recipient who found it
hard to understand why Benny Agrelo chose to die over taking his medication: "He had a whole
life ahead of him, and he should have taken his medicine."). McFarland also quotes a registered
nurse and clinical ethicist who maintained the opinion that "[i]f he was in that much pain and he
felt he was going to die anyway, I can't blame him for that choice." Id.
19. Gorman, supra note 16, at 65.
20. See, e.g., id. ("Benny... seems not only too young to die but also too young to want to.").
In other "right to die" cases, however, courts have taken the position that it is not the place of
the medical community to inflict upon a suffering individual the burden of remaining alive. See,
e.g., Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143 (1986) ("It is incongruous, if not mon-
strous, for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that someone else must
live, or, more accurately, endure.").
21. See infra part I.C. (discussing cases in which courts have permitted adolescents to discon-
tinue life-saving medical treatment).
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health care, but also to develop a comprehensive understanding of
how chronically ill minors, who experience a significant disruption of
adolescence, cope and develop over the long term.
This Comment evaluates the legitimacy of what appears to be an
evolving right of adolescents to refuse necessary medical treatment, in
light of recent research on the psychological, social, and emotional
experience of chronically ill adolescents. First, this Comment reviews
the philosophical basis of the right to refuse medical treatment and
explores how adults may practically invoke that right. It then exam-
ines the rights of minors in the health care context and details the
evolution of the mature minor doctrine. Finally, it explores the
psychosocial development of chronically ill adolescents in an attempt
to explain why ill adolescents may refuse necessary medical treatment.
In synthesizing this information, it will become apparent that the
method of evaluating maturity under the mature minor doctrine is de-
void of any substantive inquiry into the unique experience of the
chronically ill adolescent and that there is a rather attenuated nexus
between the right to refuse necessary medical treatment and the ado-
lescent's ability to make an informed life or death decision. There-
fore, the Comment concludes that it is inappropriate to legally
sanction a minor's refusal of necessary medical treatment under the
current formulation of the law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Right of Adults to Refuse Medical Treatment
The right of an adult to refuse medical treatment in present day
America has its roots in this country's long-standing moral tradition of
recognizing an individual's personal autonomy as inviolable. 22 The
law continues to respect human dignity by granting individuals the
freedom to make certain choices about their lives that comport with
their own values. 23
22. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
23. See HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 7 (1987) ("Our ethical framework draws on the value of
patient autonomy or self-determination, which establishes the right of the patient to determine
the nature of his or her own medical care."). "Self-determination" describes "people's interest
in making important decisions about their life for themselves according to their own values and
aims." Brock, supra note 5, at 193.
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In the realm of health care, personal autonomy notions are manifest
in the doctrine of informed consent.24 Informed consent generally re-
quires a physician to disclose to a patient prior to performing any
medical procedure his or her "diagnosis, the general nature of the
contemplated procedure, the risks involved, the prospects of success,
the prognosis if the procedure is not performed, and alternative medi-
cal treatment. '25 The patient may then have enough data to intelli-
gently weigh the probable risks and benefits before deciding whether
or not to submit to the proposed treatment. 26 Under the common
law, a physician must obtain his or her patient's consent prior to ad-
ministering any kind of medical treatment.2 7 Thus, a surgeon who op-
erates without first securing consent commits a battery and is liable
for damages. 28
The logical corollary to the doctrine of informed consent is the right
to informed refusal.29 Every competent adult has the right to forego
all forms of medical intervention, including life-saving or life-prolong-
ing treatment.30 However, when an individual refuses life-sustaining
treatment, the court may order the treatment if it determines that the
individual's interest in self-determination is outweighed by one or a
combination of four countervailing state interests. 31 Courts have
24. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (plurality opinion)
("This notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is
generally required for medical treatment.").
25. 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.04(3)(a)
(1995). There are several limitations to the informed consent requirement. Disclosure is not
necessary where: (1) a risk of a particular treatment is common knowledge; (2) the patient
affirmatively represents that he or she does not want the risks disclosed; (3) an informed consent
is not reasonably possible; or (4) disclosure of the risks would substantially and adversely affect
the patient's health. MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 14-15.
26. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 10 (Wash. 1972).
27. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Il. 1989).
28. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
29. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990); see also In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) ("[T]he patient's ability to control his bodily integrity through
informed consent is significant only when one recognizes that this right also encompasses a right
to informed refusal.").
Decisions allowing adults to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment have also been premised
upon the constitutional rights to privacy and liberty, see, e.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga.
1984) (holding that an incompetent adult's constitutional right to refuse treatment may be as-
serted by the family of the adult or legal guardian), and upon state statute, see, e.g., Conservator-
ship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that California Probate
Code § 2355 gives persons the right to determine the scope of their own medical treatment). For
an in-depth discussion of the federal right to privacy, see Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 296-97 (trac-
ing the development of the federal right to privacy through caselaw).
30. Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 297. For a detailed examination of the law governing the right to
die, see generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1989) (analyzing comprehensively the
reported legal cases on the right to die and the related statutory enactments).
31. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987).
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identified these interests as (1) the preservation of life, (2) the protec-
tion of innocent third parties, (3) the prevention of suicide, 32 and (4)
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.33
Although adults may refuse all forms of medical treatment absent
any overriding state interest, in recent years the issue of whether there
exists a constitutional right to die has generated considerable contro-
versy within the medical and legal communities.34 With the develop-
ment of medical technology capable of sustaining life well past the
point where, decades ago, natural forces would have brought certain
death, the number of cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment have multiplied. 35 Right to die advocates on one side of the
debate espouse that the individual's right to self-determination is ab-
32. Foregoing life-sustaining or life-saving medical treatment is not legally equivalent to com-
mitting suicide. See John W. Parry, The Court's Role in Decisionmaking Involving Incompetent
Refusals of Life-Sustaining Care and Psychiatric Medications, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABIL-
iTY L. REP. 468, 470 (1990) ("[T]he law recognizes that the right to die is a decision to forego an
intrusion into one's body which is necessary to sustain life, while suicide is the taking of one's
own life by initiating an action that harms the human organism."). Most states outlaw suicide.
Id.
33. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). Incompetent adults possess the same rights as compe-
tent adults regarding bodily integrity, including the right to refuse medical treatment. Parry,
supra note 32, at 470. However, because incompetent adults lack the legal capacity to make
decisions concerning their medical treatment, someone acting as a surrogate must exercise the
right to refuse treatment on their behalf. Id.; see, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (holding that a state institution was permitted to with-
hold chemotherapy from a profoundly retarded 67-year-old man suffering from leukemia, by
adopting a "substituted judgment" standard, whereby courts are to determine what the incompe-
tent individual would decide if he or she were competent under the prevailing circumstances).
The balance between an incompetent adult's right to self-determination and the four state
interests is somewhat altered where an individual is in a persistent vegetative state and has no
medical probability of substantial recovery. Under such circumstances, the state's interest in the
preservation of life has been held insufficient to outweigh the individual right; the state interest
in the prevention of suicide has been considered inapplicable where there was no intent to die
and where death would be the result of natural processes; the state interest in the protection of
third parties has been held to be inapplicable where third parties themselves supported termina-
tion of treatment; and the state's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession has been held not to be contravened where the prevailing standards of medical ethics
have not condemned the termination of treatment. 48 A.L.R. 4th 67 (1989); see also In re Quin-
lan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) ("We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis
dims.").
34. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1582 ("A relatively recent legal development, the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment has generated voluminous legal literature.").
35. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. banc 1988) (collecting 54 reported
decisions from 1976 through 1988); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE,
LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY 41 (1988) (stating that "the timing of
death-once a matter of fate-is now a matter of human choice").
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solute, 36 while those on the other side of the debate emphasize the
State's interest in preserving life.37
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
an adult has a constitutional right to die in the seminal case Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,38 in which it upheld a Mis-
souri state law which required clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent patient's desire to discontinue life-sustaining medical
treatment before terminating such treatment. 39 Cruzan has been
hailed as formally establishing a constitutional right to die;40 however,
a careful examination of the Court's opinion reveals that the Court
never explicitly declared such a right. Rather, the Court merely stated
that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions. '41 Despite widespread assump-
tions to the contrary, this declaration falls short of formally articulat-
ing a constitutional right to die.4 2
Moreover, the Court, concerned with the finality of terminating life-
sustaining treatment of an individual who is incapable of articulating
his or her own desires, held that Missouri could "safeguard the per-
sonal element of this choice through the imposition of heightened evi-
36. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 303 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that a decision whether to undertake some medical procedure that could
prolong the process of dying "must be made on the basis of individual values, informed by medi-
cal realities, yet within a framework governed by law," and that "[t]he role of the courts is
confined to defining that framework, delineating ways in which government may and may not
participate in such decisions").
37. This view was articulated in Cruzan: "[W]e think a State may ... simply assert an unquali-
fied interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the individual." Id. at 282.
38. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Nancy Beth Cruzan was rendered incompetent as a result of severe
injuries sustained during an automobile accident. Nancy's parents and coguardians sought a
court order directing the withdrawal of their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equip-
ment after it became apparent that she had virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive facul-
ties. Id.
39. Id. at 282.
40. See HEALTH LAW 1079 (Barry R. Furrow et al., eds. 1991) (recognizing that the syllabus
prepared for the Court's reported opinion stated that the opinion recognized a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in a competent person to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and re-
calling that Cruzan was hailed by the New York Times as the first case to acknowledge a right to
die).
41. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
42. This shortfall may have been a deliberate decision based on Court politics. See HEALTH
LAW, supra note 40, at 1079-80 (positing that because Justice Scalia, who wrote a separate con-
curring opinion, did not believe that any constitutional right was implicated in the case, it is
unlikely that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in writing the Court's plurality opinion, would formally
recognize a right to die and risk losing Justice Scalia's vote to establish a majority).
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dentiary requirements. '43 The Court's reasoning reflected profound
apprehension over legally sanctioning any individual's decision to ter-
minate life-sustaining treatment:
An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of
the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as
advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence re-
garding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unex-
pected death of the patient despite the administration of life-
sustaining treatment at least create the potential that a wrong deci-
sion will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erro-
neous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is
not susceptible of correction."
Although Cruzan involved terminating life-sustaining treatment of an
incompetent adult, the Court's logic is applicable to the situation in
which life-saving medical treatment is being refused by a chronically
ill adolescent, who is especially susceptible to forces that may alter his
or her decision-making capabilities. 45
B. Minors in the Health Care System: Rights and Doctrines46
The competing interests of self-determination and the preservation
of life, illustrated by Cruzan, are relevant to the case in which a ma-
ture adolescent refuses medical treatment. In light of the courts' his-
toric stance towards minors' decision-making capacity, it seems that
the balance between the two interests should tip in favor of preserva-
tion of life.47
Traditionally, children have not been afforded full rights to self-de-
termination where their physical well-being is at issue.48 Courts gen-
erally have adhered to the principle that minors are incapable of
making legal decisions for themselves. It is well-settled that parents
enjoy a substantive constitutional right to make decisions concerning
43. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
44. Id. at 283.
45. See infra part I.D.1. (discussing how chronic illness affects adolescents' self-esteem and
outlook on the future).
46. Much of the information in the following section was collected during the author's tenure
as an assistant to Professor Michelle Oberman. The author thanks Professor Oberman for
introducing these areas of the law and for helping to clarify the ideas presented herein.
47. Cf. Brock, supra note 5, at 192-93 ("Unlike adults, a child's good is more fully determined
by the developmental needs of children generally at that age than by his or her current but
predictably transient goals and preferences. ... The value of self-determination too constitutes a
weaker basis for children's involvement in decisionmaking than it does for adults.").
48. See Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes
Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157, 169 (1983) (explaining that "although it is
ostensibly the child whose 'best interest' is at stake, courts generally are called upon to balance
two perceptions of the child's best interest, [those of the parents and those of the state], neither
of which necessarily emanates from the individual child.").
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their children's care and welfare according to the dictates of their own
consciences. 49 However, parental autonomy must yield to state inter-
vention when parents fail to provide reasonably necessary medical
care for their children.50 The question whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a state may order medical treatment for a child over pa-
rental objections places three sets of interests in contention: (1) The
"natural rights" of parents; (2) the responsibilities of the state; and (3)
the personal needs of the child.51 Courts faced with the task of bal-
ancing these interests have uniformly decided that state intervention is
appropriate where medical treatment is necessary to save a child's
life. 52
49. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish
parents to remove their children from public school to alternatively provide them with relig-
iously-based, community-sponsored vocational training); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (according parents the right to educate their children in parochial schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (protecting the right of parents against state inter-
ference to have their children taught German in parochial school); see also Custody of a Minor,
379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978) (explaining that caselaw has recognized that these "natural
rights" of parents encompass an entire "private realm of family life" and must be protected from
unwarranted state interference). But see Sher, supra note 48, at 175 (cautioning that none of the
above-cited cases explicitly recognized a broad constitutional right of parental autonomy, but
rather, they established a limited parental right to make choices involving education, religion,
and morality).
50. See MoaIssEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 24-25 ("Under the doctrine of parens patriae,....
the state has assumed the role of all children's ultimate protector. Society has accorded the state
the right to step in and take over from parents when the latter fail to meet certain standards.");
see also Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063 (citing Richards v. Forrest, 180 N.E. 508, 511
(1932)) ("[T]he parental right to control a child's nurture ... is akin to a trust, 'subject to ... [a]
correlative duty to care for and protect the child, and ... [terminable] by [the parents'] failure to
discharge their obligations.' ").
Refusals of medical care by parents on behalf of their children are commonly based upon, but
not limited to, religious grounds. See, e.g., People ex. rel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 272-76 (Colo.
1982) (holding that a 14-year-old child with a life-endangering grand mal epileptic condition was
dependent and neglected where parents failed to obtain treatment on religious grounds, despite
a state statute which prohibited a finding of neglect if the child was in good faith "under treat-
ment solely by spiritual means through prayer"); In re Willman, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1390 (Ohio
App. 1986) (holding that the religious beliefs of parents did not justify refusing an operation to
remove a life-threatening tumor from the arm of their seven-year-old son); In re Hamilton, 657
S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. App. 1983) (ordering a 12-year-old girl to undergo chemotherapy and
radiation to treat Ewing's Sarcoma, over the religious-based objections of her father).
Refusals based on cultural beliefs also have been addressed by the courts. See, e.g., James
Feron, Mother Apparently Wins Bid to Block Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at B5 (discuss-
ing a federal judge's decision to allow a woman to have her daughter treated with traditional
Chinese remedies rather than undergo surgery, prescribed by physicians, for severe juvenile
rheumatoid arthritis).
51. For a thorough exploration of the competing interests of parents, children, and the state
that are implicated in medical decision-making for children, see Sher, supra note 48, at 166-84.
52. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King Cty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967) (upholding, in a class action brought on behalf of the 8,900 Jehovah's Witnesses in
Washington state, the constitutionality of a state law which made children of Jehovah's Wit-
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Notwithstanding the prevailing state interventionist policies regard-
ing child welfare, a Florida state court judge gave fifteen-year-old
Benny Agrelo his tacit blessing to discontinue medically necessary
treatment and die.53 If this case is indicative of a shift in the law to-
ward expanding the rights of minors in the health care system, it is
necessary not only to track the direction in which the law is moving,
but also to trace how the law has developed over the past several de-
cades and to identify the objectives that have steered it along its
course of evolution.
1. Minors' Capacity in Tort Law - Common Law Position
"Capacity" is a murky tort law concept. Although the law generally
maintains its traditional protective posture toward minors, cases re-
flect that under limited circumstances, minors have the capacity to
consent to certain kinds of invasions and conduct.5 4 A minor is pre-
sumed to acquire the capacity to consent when he or she has the abil-
ity of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and
benefits of a proposed course of action.55
In the realm of health care, the common law position was that until
reaching the age of majority, a minor lacked legal authority to consent
to his or her own health care treatment.5 6 Authority to consent was
nesses wards of the court and authorized blood transfusions when their parents refused them on
religious grounds). In Custody of a Minor, the Massachusetts Supreme Court invoked a balanc-
ing test and found:
[Tihe parents' refusal to continue with chemotherapy amounted to an unwillingness to
provide the type of medical care which was necessary and proper for the child's well-
being. Where, as here, the child's very life was at stake, such a finding is sufficient to
support an order removing legal custody from the parents, even though the parents are
loving and devoted in all other respects.
379 N.E.2d at 1065.
53. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Benny Agrelo, who
was permitted by a Florida state judge to discontinue critical medical treatment).
54. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 115 (5th ed.
1984).
55. Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 So. 501, 502 (Miss. 1928). To reflect the minor's reason-
ing abilities as they evolve through different stages of his or her development, capacity some-
times has been determined by the "Rule of Sevens." Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745
(Tenn. 1987). The Rule of Sevens provides that under the age of seven, a child has no capacity;
between the ages of seven and fourteen, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the minor has
no capacity; and between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one, there exists a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the individual has capacity. Id.
56. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,47 (1994); Tania E. Wright, A Minor's Right To Consent
to Medical Care, 25 How. L.J. 525, 525-26 (1982).
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delegated exclusively to parents and guardians. 57 This precept was de-
fended on two grounds. First, the law presumed that a minor lacked
the maturity and wisdom to correctly determine his or her medical
needs. 58 Second, the law accorded parents (primarily fathers) abso-
lute control over all aspects of their children's upbringing.59 Health
care providers risked being subject to an action for assault and battery
for rendering treatment to a minor without first obtaining parental
consent.60 The practical result of the parental consent rule was that
children in need of medical attention were left untreated. 61
2. Early Exceptions to the Common Law Rule
Early exceptions to the common law rule emerged in order to ad-
dress the needs of those minors who required emergency medical
treatment 62 or were emancipated. 63 It is uncontroverted that in an
emergency, a minor of any age may be treated without parental con-
57. See Angela R. Holder, Children and Adolescents: Their Right To Decide About Their Own
Health Care, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 161, 161 (Loretta
M. Kopelman & John C. Moskop eds. 1989) [hereinafter Holder, Right To Decide].
58. Eve W. Paul, Legal Rights of Minors to Sex-Related Medical Care, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 357, 359-60 (1974).
59. Holder, Right To Decide, supra note 57, at 161; Comment, Counseling the Counselors:
Legal Implications of Counseling Minors Without Parental Consent, 31 MD. L. REV. 332, 335-38
(1971).
60. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 124-25; see, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121,
123 (CA DC 1941) (holding that a mother had a cause of action where her 15-year-old son
donated skin for grafts for his cousin who had been badly burned, and the procedure was per-
formed at the hospital without her knowledge or consent); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225,
226-27 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920) (holding that parents had a cause of action where a doctor
operated on their 11-year-old daughter to remove enlarged adenoids without obtaining their
consent, and the daughter died post-operatively before coming out of anesthesia).
61. As one commentator notes, "Besides hampering the minor's ability to obtain needed med-
ical services in the absence of his or her parents' consent, the traditional concept of the parental
right also led to extreme judicial reluctance to order medical care for a minor in opposition to a
parent's express refusal to consent." Wright, supra note 56, at 527.
One may envision the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection implications of a situation in
which the respective medical treatment of a minor and an adult, both afflicted with the same
illness, differed insofar as the minor was sent away, and the adult was treated. HOLDER, LEGAL
ISSUES, supra note 6, at 124. For further discussion of minors' constitutional right to medical
care, see id.
62. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1586 ("[Elarly common law, recognizing that physicians'
fear of liability might discourage prompt treatment, implied consent in emergency situations.
This type of exception is 'situational,' because its applicability turns on the type of treatment
decision involved.") (footnote omitted).
63. See MoRISSEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 32 ("We have been unable to discover a single
instance of a physician's being found liable for providing care to an emancipated youth on his or
her own consent and without the consent of parents."); see also Holder, Right To Decide, supra
note 57, at 162 (explaining that the Anglo-American legal system has acknowledged the notion
of an "emancipated minor" for at least 200 years).
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sent.64 "Anything requiring relatively urgent attention or that is caus-
ing a child pain or fear" constitutes an emergency.65 The emergency
exception reflects that it is cruel to allow a child to suffer pain for an
extended period of time because a health care professional refuses to
render treatment for fear of being sued by the patient's parents.66
The second traditional exception to the common law rule allows
emancipated minors to consent to their own medical care. Although
jurisdictions vary in their definitions of "emancipation," generally an
emancipated minor is "one whose parents have completely surren-
dered care, custody, and control of the child, have no involvement in
the child's earnings, and have renounced parental duties. '67 For ex-
ample, married minors are deemed emancipated and may consent to
medical treatment for themselves or their own minor children.68
3. Minor Treatment Statutes
The bulk of the modern exceptions to the common law rule have
been codified in minor treatment statutes.69 These statutes specify a
particular age "at which a minor may be considered completely in-
dependent for health care purposes and treatment may be given as if
he or she were an adult. '70 Like the traditional exceptions discussed
above, minor treatment statutes were created to address the specific
64. See, e.g., Luka v. Lowrie, 136 N.W. 1106 (Mich. 1912) (holding that the defendant physi-
cian was justified in amputating a badly injured foot of a 15-year-old boy where the boy was
unconscious and had no accessible friends or relatives); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 279 N.Y.S. 575
(N.Y. 1935) (finding the defendant physician not liable on a theory of assault for not obtaining
parental consent where he administered ether to a 20-year-old boy before setting and casting the
boy's swollen ankle). Where emergency treatment is negligent, the minor (through his or her
parent or guardian) may sue the physician just as if parental consent had been given. HOLDER,
LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 138.
65. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 125-26; see also Holder, Right To Decide, supra
note 57, at 161 (explaining that the emergency exception extends to minor conditions such as a
sore throat or an earache).
66. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 126.
67. Sher, supra note 48, at 158 n.5; see also Wright, supra note 56, at 529 ("The language of
emancipation, however, places more emphasis on acts of release of the child by his parents and
the actual independence, than on the child's judgment or appearance of maturity.").
68. Holder, Right To Decide, supra note 57, at 162; see, e.g., Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp.,
267 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (N.Y. 1966) (dismissing a married minor woman's assault action against the
hospital where a biopsy was performed with her consent). Minors in the military also have been
considered entirely emancipated. See, e.g., Swenson v. Swenson, 227 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Mo. 1950)
(holding that a minor's enlistment in military service "terminated" and "extinguished" the legal
duty of his mother to maintain and support him). The scope of emancipated minors has ex-
panded in some jurisdictions to include college students (even those who are still financially
dependent on their parents), unmarried minor mothers, pregnant minors, and runaways.
Holder, Right To Decide, supra, at 162.
69. See infra notes 73, 77, 78 (providing examples of minor treatment statutes).
70. Holder, Right To Decide, supra note 57, at 162.
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health needs of minors and society. These statutes do not hinge on
the maturity of the minor, nor were they created to further the rights
of a minor who exhibits the maturity of an adult.71 Rather, most of
the statutory exceptions to the common law rule prohibiting minors
from consenting to their own medical care focus on specific diseases,
conditions, or treatments. 72
Earlier statutes, drafted in the late 1960's, permitted unemancipated
minors to consent to care for sexually transmitted diseases.73 These
laws were inspired by evidence of the growing prevalence of such dis-
eases among adolescents and the fear that adolescents would not seek
care if they first were required to inform their parents and obtain their
consent.74 Society's interest in halting the spread of sexually transmit-
ted diseases was the true motivating force in promulgating these laws,
not society's belief that some minors could be sufficiently mature to
make medical decisions for themselves. 75 Minor treatment statutes
may also be deemed an outgrowth of the emergency exception,76 as
evidenced by the fact that many states now have statutes that allow
minors to obtain treatment without parental consent for alcohol and
substance abuse 77 and psychiatric care.78
71. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the underlying motives for the
enactment of minor treatment statutes).
72. Wright, supra note 56, at 531.
73. Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decisionmaking for Children: An Analysis of Competing Inter-
ests, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 689, 701 (1982); Oberman, supra note 56, at 48. All jurisdictions have
minor treatment statutes which permit unemancipated minors to consent to care for sexually
transmitted diseases. Holder, Right To Decide, supra note 57, at 161.
For examples of modem statutes which allow minors to consent to treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases, see ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-132.01
(1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2892 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402 (1991); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 129.060 (Michie Supp. 1991).
74. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 130.
75. See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 64 (" 'Privacy' legislation dealing with venereal disease and
drug and alcohol abuse is really state guidance of adolescents rather than any recognition of
autonomy. In public policy terms, there is only one right answer to the question of whether
alcoholism, drug misuse, or venereal disease should be treated rather than ignored."). The
Supreme Court of Tennessee also recently stated, "[T]hese statutes do no more than provide
conditional immunities from certain types of liability in specific situations.., or promote certain
social purposes, such as treatment of drug abuse or venereal disease in minors." Cardwell v.
Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tenn. 1987).
76. Oberman, supra note 56, at 48.
77. For examples of modem statutes which allow minors to obtain treatment for alcohol and
substance abuse, see ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2892a (1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-1-402 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.050 (Michie Supp. 1991). One com-
mentator explains that minor treatment statutes for substance abuse reflect "clear public policy
interests in controlling and eradicating this serious and ubiquitous problem. States recognize
that adolescent minors are particularly at risk and are unlikely to seek out help if not offered
confidential care." MoRIussEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 74.
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4. Development of the Mature Minor Doctrine
Beyond the statutory exceptions to the common law rule, which are
triggered by the type of treatment sought, there exists a gray area into
which the common law has attempted to extend the rights of minors
regarding their health care. These other principal exceptions to the
common law rule may be best characterized as miscellaneous compo-
nents of an amorphous "mature minor" doctrine, which has been a
vehicle for allowing minors to consent to medical treatment in the ab-
sence of a minor treatment statute and without parental or guardian
consent. 79 Most likely, it was the mature minor doctrine which ena-
bled Benny Agrelo to discontinue his immunosuppressant regimen80
and which will be utilized in future refusal of treatment and right to
die cases involving adolescents. The mature minor doctrine has no
formal definition; however, one commentator explains that the cases
in which the rule has been applied have had the following factors in
common:
1. The treatment was undertaken for the benefit of the minor
rather than a third party.
2. The particular minor was near majority (or at least in the
range of 15 years of age upward) and was considered to have suffi-
cient mental capacity to understand fully the nature and importance
of the medical steps proposed.
78. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1975) (permitting a minor who is 14 years or older, or who has
graduated from high school, or who is married or divorced, or is pregnant, to consent to mental
health service); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-103 (1989) (permitting minors aged 15 years or older
to consent to mental health services from a state-licensed hospital or physician); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 394.56(1) (1985) (providing that minors 12 years old and older may consent to outpa-
tient mental health services, provided there is a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the
application); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-20 (1985) (providing that a minor who is at least 12 years
old may consent to admission for psychiatric care).
79. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1586-87 (explaining that "the mature minor doctrine enables
a minor to consent to treatment unilaterally based upon his or her ability to understand and
weigh the risks and benefits involved in the decision"). The mature minor doctrine tends to fill
in the gaps left by minor treatment statutes. See Oberman, supra note 56, at 48 ("Minor treat-
ment laws enhance a minor's power to consent in only a narrow set of statutorily specified situa-
tions. As a result, minors are frequently seeking non-emergency medical treatment to which
they are not statutorily permitted to consent."). Moreover, maturity-based exceptions differ
from statutory and emancipation-based exceptions in that the former depend on the minor's
competence in relation to a specific decision, whereas the latter rely upon "objective proxies to
afford general consent rights." Hawkins, supra, at 1587.
80. Cf. Teenager Allowed To Discontinue Liver Treatment (NPR radio broadcast, June 15,
1994) (discussing the case of Benny Agrelo, a reporter explained, "Health care officials generally
believe minors are too young to make life and death decisions, so, in Florida, it was left to a
judge to determine if Benito Agrelo, at age 15, was mature enough to refuse treatment."). The
actual legal basis for the judge's decision in the Benny Agrelo case is uncertain because judicial
opinions in juvenile cases are sealed.
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3. The medical procedures could be characterized by the court
as less than "major" or "serious."'81
Although under the aforementioned criteria the mature minor doc-
trine conceivably could apply in almost all cases involving an adoles-
cent's consent to health care, courts are generally unwilling to give the
mature minor exception a broad interpretation. 82
One of the first reported cases involving the mature minor excep-
tion to the common law rule requiring parental consent for the medi-
cal treatment of a minor was Bakker v. Welsh.83 In Bakker, the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that a surgeon was not liable to a
father for performing an operation to remove an ear tumor on a sev-
enteen-year-old boy, where the boy's father had not given consent and
the boy died during the administration of anesthesia.84 The court rea-
soned that although it was not clear exactly who gave the consent for
surgery, the boy was accompanied by an aunt and a sister, and all
three of them understood that an operation was going to be per-
formed on the boy.85 Interestingly, the opinion did not discuss the
boy's maturity.
More recently, in Cardwell v. Bechtol,86 the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee explicitly adopted the mature minor exception to the parental
consent rule.87 In Cardwell, a young woman, seventeen years and
81. Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOOD HALL L.J.
115 (1973); see also Holder, Right To Decide, supra note 57, at 163 ("[A] young person (of 14 or
15 or over) [who] understands the nature of proposed treatment and its risks and can give the
same degree of informed consent as an adult patient, and the treatment does not involve very
serious risks .... may validly consent to receiving it.").
The American Bar Association has declared that "a minor of [sixteen] or older who has suffi-
cient capacity to understand the nature and consequences of a proposed medical treatment for
his or her benefit may consent to that treatment on the same terms as an adult." Standards
Relating to Rights of Minors, 1980 .J.A./A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT § 4.6
A. The brackets around sixteen are intended to minimize the significance of the age of the
minor, thereby placing the emphasis on the minor's capacity to understand the nature and conse-
quences of the proposed treatment as the essential prerequisite to informed consent to the treat-
ment. Id.
These definitions indicate that the mature minor doctrine contemplates that a minor attempt-
ing to invoke it is seeking beneficial or minor treatment. Thus, in the case of Benny Agrelo, if
the mature minor doctrine was the basis of the judge's decision to let Benny discontinue life-
saving medical treatment, the doctrine was utilized incorrectly.
82. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987) ("Adoption of the mature mi-
nor exception to the common law rule is by no means a general license to treat minors without
parental consent and its application is dependent on the facts of each case. It must be seen in the
context of the tort in question.").
83. 108 N.W. 94 (Mich. 1906).
84. Id. at 96.
85. Id.
86. 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
87. Id. at 749.
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seven months old, went to see the defendant doctor on her own initia-
tive and without her parents' knowledge, seeking relief from back
pain.88 The defendant did not inquire about parental consent prior to
rendering manipulative therapy because he believed, based upon the
young woman's demeanor, that she was of age.89 The parents of the
young woman brought an action for battery after complications from
the treatment arose.90 The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the
defendant could not be held liable on a theory of battery for failing to
obtain the consent of the minor's parents, reasoning that the young
woman had "the judgment, ability, education, and training at her sev-
enteen years, seven months to have the capacity to consent and did in
fact consent to the Defendant's treatment." 91
In 1992, in Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center,92 the
Supreme Court of West Virginia followed the Cardwell court's lead
and formally recognized the existence of a mature minor exception to
the common law rule of parental consent.93 The court clarified that
where a child is a "mature minor," the physician must obtain the
child's consent before performing a procedure upon the child or ad-
ministering or withholding treatment from him or her.94 The court
further explained that whether a minor has the capacity to consent
depends upon the following:
[The] age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of ma-
turity or judgment obtained by the child, as well as upon the con-
duct and demeanor of the child at the time of the procedure or
treatment ... [and] whether the minor has the capacity to appreci-
ate the nature, risks, and consequences of the medical procedure to
be performed, or the treatment to be administered or withheld.95
Regarding physician liability, the Belcher court concluded that
"[w]here there is a conflict between the intentions of one or both par-
ents and the minor, the physician's good faith assessment of the mi-
nor's maturity level would immunize him or her from liability for the
failure to obtain parental consent. '96
The most common and arguably the most instructive applications of
the mature minor doctrine arise in the context of minors seeking con-
88. Id. at 741.
89. Id. at 743.
90. Id. at 742.
91. Id. at 755.
92. 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
93. Id. at 838.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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traceptives or abortions. 97 However, as Professor Michelle Oberman
has observed through her research on statutory rape, "[Alt no point in
the line of cases permitting minors' access to reproductive health care
is there any substantive discussion of what constitutes maturity .... 98
In fact, "the Supreme Court's decisions ignore the issue of how minors
are supposed to demonstrate their maturity." 99
Contraceptive freedom for both adults and minors is based on con-
stitutionally-guarded privacy interests. 100 More than thirty years ago,
in Griswold v. Connecticut,'0' the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting the distribution of contra-
ceptives to married adults. 0 2 Twelve years later, in Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International,0 3 the Court extended its holding in
Griswold to minors104 and struck down a state statute which prohib-
ited distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of
age.10 5 At first glance it may seem that the Court afforded minors
access to contraceptives because it had been positively demonstrated
that minors have the capacity to exercise mature judgment in making
adult-like decisions. However, a closer examination of the Carey
opinion reveals a more paternalistic motivation-that it was in adoles-
cents' best interests to have access to contraceptives in light of the
pervasive problems of sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, and
97. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 278 (1st
Dist. 1986)
(These decisions [applying the constitutional right of sexual privacy to minors] have
created the "mature minor" standard, declaring that a minor of sufficient maturity to
make reproductive health care decisions enjoys the same constitutional privileges as an
adult, including access to contraceptives and the ability to make a decision whether or
not to undergo an abortion without undue interference from the state.);
see also Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1601-02 ("[J]udicial 'answers' to some of the legal questions in
this context [of reproductive freedom] ... represent attempts to define the boundaries of state
and parental authority over minors' decisionmaking autonomy.").
98. Oberman, supra note 56, at 50.
99. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
100. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) ("While the outer limits
of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions
that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions
'relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and edu-
cation.' ") (citations omitted).
101. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. Id. at 483-86. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court held that states cannot bar
contraceptive access to unmarried adults. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
103. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
104. Id. at 687 ("Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit
a married couple's use of contraceptives.... [T]he teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution
protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.").
105. Id. at 682.
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illegitimate births.10 6 As one commentator explains, "Carey is a clas-
sic case of deregulation-in this instance given constitutional recogni-
tion-to avoid harming kids in the name of helping them. ' 10 7
The Carey opinion is a telling commentary on minors' rights in gen-
eral. The Court cautioned that state restrictions inhibiting privacy
rights of minors are valid if they serve a "significant" state interest
beyond what would be relevant to an adult.'0 8 The Court noted that
this standard, while less demanding than the "compelling" state inter-
est test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults, was ap-
propriate because states have greater latitude to regulate the conduct
of children and because "the law has generally regarded minors as
having a lesser capability for making important decisions."'1 09
The court's goal of bestowing upon an adolescent girl the lesser of
two evils is also apparent in the context of abortion. In 1976, the
United States Supreme Court declared in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth"O that states were expressly prohibited from requiring parental
consent for an unmarried minor's abortion.' However, the Court
implied that it would be constitutional for a state to require a judicial
determination that a minor is mature enough to give informed con-
sent.112 Within the Danforth opinion, Justice Blackmun recognized
that states traditionally have had broader authority to regulate the ac-
tivities of minors than the activities of adults, based on the states' in-
terest in child protection.1 3 Justice Stevens, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, asserted that the state's interest in protecting mi-
nors from the consequences of incorrect decisions was valid 1 4 and
therefore, requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion was
"surely not irrational.""115
106. In the Carey opinion, the Court cites statistics regarding the incidence of teenage preg-
nancy and abortion, and discusses social problems associated with teenage pregnancy, including
forced marriages and impairment of educational opportunities. Id. at 696 n.21. For a detailed
discussion of the debate over whether to provide minors access to contraceptives, see HOLDER,
LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 6, at 267-75.
107. ZIMRiNG, supra note 1, at 62.
108. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977).
109. Id. at 693 n.15; see also supra notes 7, 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing the law's
traditional presumption that minor's are incapable of making legal decisions for themselves).
110. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
111. Id. at 74.
112. Katherine M. Waters, Note, Judicial Consent To Abort: Assessing a Minor's Maturity, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90, 90 n.5 (1985).
113. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a
state law that prohibited the sale of sex-related magazines to minors) and Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding child labor laws)).
114. Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
19961 1183
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Since Danforth was decided, a plethora of decisions have attempted
to clarify the myriad of competing interests in a minor's decision to
have an abortion." 6 To this end, in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1),"7 the
United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, concluded that a
state could require a minor to consult with a parent before obtaining
an abortion only if it also provided the minor with the alternative of
seeking a judicial bypass of the parental consent requirement.118
Thus, if a minor so wishes, she may go directly to a court or designated
administrative agency where "[i]f she satisfies the court that she is ma-
ture and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion de-
cision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without
parental consultation or consent."" 9 However, if the minor is not
found to exhibit the requisite maturity to make the decision indepen-
dently, she may still be authorized to have the abortion if the court or
agency finds that it would be in her best interests. 120
Although Bellotti II granted a pregnant minor the alternative of
proving that she is sufficiently mature to consent to an abortion inde-
pendently of her parents, the Court failed to provide a set of objective
criteria for measuring her maturity.' 21 The Court's only guidance lies
in two phrases inconspicuously woven into its opinion which state that
a mature minor is one who is "well enough informed to make intelli-
gently the abortion decision on her own"' 22 and "fully competent to
assess the implications of the choice she has made."'21 3 A determina-
tion of maturity that depends merely on the minor knowing and ap-
preciating the possible effects and consequences of a given procedure
has been criticized by commentators since the Bellotti II decision was
handed down. 124 In the context of an adolescent refusing necessary
116. See Waters, supra note 112, at 90 ("The evolution of the 'mature-minor' standard reflects
the Court's effort to balance a minor's privacy rights with the legitimate interests of her parents
and the state.").
117. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 643, 647.
119. Id. at 647.
120. Id. at 647-48.
121. See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Note, When Is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When Is an Abortion
in Her Best Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio's Abortion Parental Notification
Law: In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1991), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 916 (1992) (noting
that "Justice Powell wrote virtually nothing about how to determine best interests, and only
briefly noted how difficult it was to determine maturity"); Waters, supra note 112, at 101 ("Fun-
damental rights of mature minors are effectively dependent on a concept that the Court has
failed to delimit with adequate specificity.").
122. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).
123. Id. at 650.
124. See, e.g., Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitution and the Anomaly of the Pregnant Teen-
ager, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 553, 566-74 (1982) (criticizing Bellotti Is failure to provide any substan-
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medical treatment, where the stakes are arguably higher than in the
abortion context, 125 the broad Bellotti If framework is unsuitable for
assessing maturity. A fuller inquiry is warranted.
C. Refusal of Medical Treatment and the Mature Minor Doctrine
Only recently has the mature minor doctrine been invoked in the
context of a minor refusing life-saving medical treatment.126 How-
ever, the few cases in which courts have been faced with a minor who
will almost certainly die if the refused medical treatment is not admin-
istered suggest that courts have taken a leap in the direction of ex-
tending to adolescents whatever "right" to die exists for adults. 127 A
review of the relevant caselaw reveals that although it is unlikely that
any judge would ever explicitly hold that a minor has a constitutional
"right" to die,' 28 opinions suggest that the right does implicitly exist
under certain circumstances, namely where the minor is found to be
"mature.' 2 9 If this is so, it is crucial that courts develop a rational
definition of "maturity" and apply it consistently. In an effort to de-
limit the boundaries of the mature minor doctrine, this section traces
the circumstances in which the mature minor doctrine has been ap-
tive standard for future maturity determinations); Gene Lindsey, Comment, The Viability of
Parental Abortion Notification and Consent Statutes: Assessing Fact and Fiction, 38 AM. U. L.
REv. 881, 892 n.66 (1989) ("The difficulty with the Court's approach is that maturity and best
interests have not been adequately defined, and as a consequence, the judicial bypass mechanism
remains highly subjective."). One commentator has suggested that the Court require judges to
assess "qualities recognized by educational and psychological disciplines as useful maturational
standards indicative of an individual's ability to understand and bear the consequences of a seri-
ous decision." Waters, supra note 112, at 98-102.
125. By this statement, the author simply points out that an adolescent who refuses life-saving
medical treatment will meet an imminent and often immediate death, whereas a pregnant ado-
lescent will not certainly die as an imminent and immediate consequence of being refused an
abortion.
126. See infra notes 130-77 and accompanying text (discussing three cases involving minors
refusing life-saving medical treatment decided since 1989 in which a mature minor standard was
considered).
127. Although no court has articulated a "right" to die on behalf of minors, the right seems to
exist under certain circumstances by virtue of the fact that in at least one case in which the
mature minor standard was employed to allow a minor to refuse or discontinue life-saving medi-
cal treatment, the minor's death was the inevitable consequence of the court's decision. See In re
E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Il1. 1989); see infra notes 130-47 and accompanying text (discussing E.G.
in detail). This is a gross deviation from the common law position, which prohibited minors of
any age or maturity level from even consenting to beneficial medical treatment.
128. Cf. Holder, Right To Decide, supra note 57, at 164 (opining, "[W]here treatment is neces-
sary, even if not life-saving, I doubt seriously that a minor has the right to refuse it.").
129. See infra notes 130-77 and accompanying text (discussing three cases involving minors
refusing life-saving medical treatment decided since 1989 in which a mature minor standard was
contemplated).
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plied either to allow or to prohibit an adolescent from refusing neces-
sary medical treatment.
A pivotal case in which a court invoked the mature minor doctrine
to allow a minor to refuse medically necessary treatment is In re
E.G. 130 In that case, seventeen-year-old E.G. needed blood transfu-
sions for the treatment of leukemia. 131 She and her mother refused to
consent to the transfusions, contending that "acceptance of blood
would violate personal religious convictions rooted in their member-
ship in the Jehovah's Witness faith.' 132 Without the transfusions, E.G.
was likely to die within one month, whereas with the treatment, which
included blood transfusions and chemotherapy, there was an eighty
percent chance that the disease would go into remission. 133 Although
during two juvenile court hearings several doctors testified as to
E.G.'s maturity, both courts declined to sanction E.G.'s refusal of the
blood transfusions. 134
However, on appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals extended to "ma-
ture minors" the holding of In re Estate of Brooks, 35 which guaran-
teed adult Jehovah's Witnesses a First Amendment right to refuse
130. 549 N.E.2d 322 (I11. 1989).
131. Id. at 323.
132. Id. The First Amendment right of adult Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions
was first recognized in In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965). The foundation for
Jehovah's Witnesses' belief regarding the acceptance of blood is found in quotes from the Acts of
the Apostles 15:20 ("Hence my decision is not to trouble those from the nations who are turning
to God, but to write to them to abstain from things polluted by idols and from fornication and
from what is strangled and from blood."); and from Leviticus 17:10 ("As for any man of the
house of Israel or some alien resident who is residing as an alien in your midst, who eats any sort
of blood, I shall certainly set my face against the soul that is eating the blood, and I shall indeed
cut him off from among his people."). For an interesting case discussing the rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions, see Jehovah's Witnesses in Washington v. King Cty.
Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
133. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323. The long-term survival rate for treated patients with E.G.'s type
of medical condition was 20-25%. Id.
134. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that at the first juvenile court hearing, E.G.'s treating
physician, Dr. Yachnin, testified that "he discussed the proposed course of treatment with E.G.,
that E.G. was competent to understand the consequences of accepting or rejecting treatment,
and he was impressed with her maturity and the sincerity of her beliefs." Id. Dr. Yachnin's
evaluation of E.G.'s competency was corroborated by the testimony of Jane McAtee, the associ-
ate general counsel for the University of Chicago Hospital. Id. The juvenile trial court ap-
pointed McAtee temporary guardian and authorized her to consent to blood transfusions on
E.G.'s behalf. Id. at 324. E.G. received several transfusions. Id.
At E.G.'s second juvenile court hearing, Dr. Littner, a psychiatrist regarded as having special
expertise in evaluating the maturity and competency of minors, expressed the opinion that E.G.
had the maturity level of an 18- to 21-year-old. Id. However, the court concluded that "the
State's interest in this case was greater than the interest E.G. and her mother had in refusing to
consent to treatment." Id. at 324.
135. 205 N.E.2d 435 (I11. 965).
1186
MISUSE OF MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
blood transfusions. 136 The appellate court reasoned that because the
United States Supreme Court allowed mature minors, through the ex-
ercise of constitutional privacy rights, to consent to abortions without
parental approval, the extension of other rights guaranteed to adults
was "inevitable. '137 The court also found that since E.G. was merely
six months shy of her eighteenth birthday, she was "partially emanci-
pated" and therefore had the right to refuse blood transfusions. 138
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that part of the decision by the
Illinois Court of Appeals holding that E.G. was a mature minor and
therefore could refuse blood transfusions. 139 However, instead of bas-
ing its decision on federal constitutional grounds, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that minors may possess and exercise rights regarding
medical care as a function of Illinois common law.' 40 After explaining
that the age eighteen "is not an impenetrable barrier that magically
precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain rights nor-
mally associated with adulthood,' 41 the court declared that the ma-
ture minor doctrine affords a minor the common law right to consent
to or refuse medical treatment if the evidence is clear and convincing
that he or she is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an
adult. 42 Just as courts employ an "equation" to determine whether
an adult may refuse life-saving medical treatment, 43 the E.G. court
evaluated the strength of the minor's right to refuse treatment against
four state interests: (1) Preserving life; (2) protecting third parties; (3)
preventing suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. 1
136. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
137. Id. For relevant abortion cases, see City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
138. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
139. Id. at 328.
140. Id. at 326.
141. Id. at 325. The court pointed out that, in many jurisdictions, minors are treated as adults
under circumstances such as the following: Under minor treatment statutes and the criminal
Juvenile Court Act; in the context of abortion; and pursuant to other constitutional rights, in-
cluding freedom of expression, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right
to privacy. Id. at 325-26.
142. Id. at 327-28. The court explained that "[a] minor may have a long and fruitful life ahead
that an immature, foolish decision could jeopardize," and that the clear and convincing evidence
standard furthered the state's public policy of placing high value on the sanctity of life. Id. at
327.
143. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (explaining the method by which courts
determine an adult's legal ability to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment).
144. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328. The court noted that protection of third parties is the interest
that weighs most heavily against the minor's right to refuse treatment where parents object to
the refusal. Id. The court also cautioned that "[w]here the health care issues are potentially life
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Justice Ward, one of two dissenting justices, challenged the court's
decision on several grounds.145 Justice Ward first questioned the
court's skewed logic in allowing a minor to make a life and death
decision:
I am sure that in a host of matters of far lesser importance it would
not be held that a minor however mature could satisfy a require-
ment of being of legal age. It would not be held that a minor was
eligible to vote, to obtain a driver's or pilot's license, or to enlist in
one of the armed services before attaining enlistment age.146
Justice Ward also criticized the court for failing to state a standard by
which a minor's maturity should be measured in future cases.' 47
Although Justice Ward's dissenting opinion identified obvious incon-
sistencies in the law's treatment of minors and observed that the ma-
jority's opinion lacked guidance for future cases, these issues have not
been addressed in subsequent refusal of treatment cases involving
adolescents.
In Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center,148 Larry Belcher, Jr.,
who was confined to a wheelchair as a result of muscular dystrophy,
was seventeen years and eight months old when he suffered respira-
tory arrest. 49 At the hospital, doctors told Larry's parents that if
Larry suffered another such attack, he would likely become respira-
tor-dependent and have to be tube-fed. 50 One of the defendants, Dr.
Ayoubi, asked Larry's parents whether they would want Larry sub-
jected to resuscitative measures if he suffered another respiratory fail-
ure.' 5' Larry's parents told Dr. Ayoubi that they did not want Larry
resuscitated unless Larry requested it.152 Although Larry was not in-
volved in the decision, 153 a "Do Not Resuscitate" (DNR) order was
nonetheless prepared. 54
Subsequently, Larry suffered another respiratory arrest and cardiac
failure, and because the hospital staff complied with the DNR order,
threatening, the State's parens patriae interest is greater than if the health care matter is less
consequential." Id. at 327.
145. Id. at 328-29 (Ward, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 329 (Ward, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Ward, J., dissenting).
148. 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
149. Id. at 829-30.
150. Id. at 830.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Larry did not participate in the decision because Dr. Ayoubi felt that Larry was emotion-
ally immature, that his medication diminished his capacity, and that the decision would have
increased his anxiety. Id.
154. Id.
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he died.155 Larry's parents sued the hospital and Dr. Ayoubi for
wrongful death, alleging medical malpractice and claiming that Larry
should have been consulted prior to the issuance of the DNR order, in
light of the "mature minor" exception to the common law rule of pa-
rental consent. 156
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that informed
consent by a mature minor is required before issuing a DNR order for
that minor.157 The court explicitly recognized the existence of a ma-
ture minor exception to the common law rule of parental consent in
the state of West Virginia158 and commented that "[i]t is difficult to
imagine that a young person who is under the age of majority, yet,
who has undergone medical treatment for a permanent or recurring
illness over the course of a long period of time, may not be capable of
taking part in decisions concerning that treatment.' 59 The court fur-
ther held that in determining whether a particular minor is "mature,"
the trier of fact should take into consideration the minor's age, ability,
experience, education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment,
and demeanor at the time of treatment. 60
The mature minor doctrine also has been used to deny an adoles-
cent the right to refuse medical treatment. In In re Long Island Jewish
Medical Center,'6' Phillip Malcolm, several weeks shy of turning eight-
een, needed blood transfusions as part of treatment for a malignant
form of pediatric cancer.' 62 With treatment, Phillip had a twenty to
twenty-five percent chance for survival, whereas without treatment,
he was certain to die within one month. 63
Phillip and his mother and step-father adamantly opposed the trans-
fusions on the ground that their religion, the Jehovah's Witness faith,
did not permit the acceptance of blood. 164 Although the family had
joined Jehovah's Witnesses in 1987, Phillip testified that when he orig-
155. Id.
156. Id. at 830-31.
157. Id. at 838. The court stated that "except in very extreme cases, a physician has no legal
right to perform a procedure upon, or administer or withhold treatment from a ... child without
the consent of the child's parents or guardian, unless the child is a mature minor, in which case
the child's consent would be required." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 837.
160. Id. at 836. In this particular case, the issue was remanded to determine whether Larry
came within the mature minor exception so as to have been entitled to consent to the treatment
involved. Id. at 838.
161. 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
162. Id. at 240-41.
163. Id. at 241.
164. Id.; see also supra note 132 (discussing the bases for Jehovah's Witnesses' refusal of blood
transfusions).
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inally began to study the teachings of this religion, he lost interest. 165
Phillip did not know the books of the Bible, but he did understand the
basic tenet of the religion's prohibition regarding blood transfusions,
and he stated that if the court ordered the transfusions it would not be
his responsibility or sin.166 Phillip also indicated that he consulted his
parents before making decisions and considered himself a "child."'1 67
The court held that while there was "much merit" to the mature
minor doctrine, Phillip's lack of understanding of his religion and his
medical condition mitigated against any finding of maturity under the
doctrine. 68 The court authorized Phillip's doctors to administer
blood transfusions whenever medically necessary during treatment
until Phillip turned eighteen. 69
The mature minor doctrine was also rejected in 0. G. v. Baum.170 In
that case, a sixteen-year-old Jehovah's Witness was severely injured in
a train accident. Surgery, which would have required blood transfu-
sions, was necessary to save O.G.'s right arm.171 If the arm was ampu-
tated, however, O.G. may or may not have needed transfusions.172
Although both a County Child Protective Services caseworker and
O.G.'s father stated that O.G. understood that refusing blood transfu-
sions could be fatal, the Texas court declined to adopt the mature mi-
nor standard. 173
The court rejected In re E.G.174 as a basis for allowing O.G. to re-
fuse the blood transfusions.17 5 In its discussion of E.G., the Texas
court identified three distinguishing characteristics from the case at
bar: (1) The court in E.G. did not apply federal constitutional law; (2)
the record before the Illinois court contained testimony establishing
E.G.'s competency; and (3) E.G. testified in court.176 Dismissing E.G.
as inapplicable, and finding both Texas state law and federal law un-
settled regarding the right of a sixteen-year-old to refuse blood trans-
fusions, the O.G. court authorized the hospital to administer the
transfusions to O.G. as needed during surgery.177
165. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 242.
168. Id. at 243.
169. Id. at 243 n.15.
170. 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
171. Id. at 840.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 549 N.E.2d 322 (I11. 1989).
175. O.G., 790 S.W.2d at 842.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Read together, these cases highlight the problems that result from
using the mature minor doctrine in the context of an adolescent refus-
ing life-saving medical treatment. The disparity among jurisdictions in
their use of the doctrine, the inherent vagueness of the concept of
maturity, and the complexity of the medical and legal matters in-
volved in treatment refusal cases effectively undermine the doctrine's
efficacy. When an adolescent who refuses necessary medical treat-
ment is brought to court, such as in the case of In re E.G. or Benny
Agrelo, the sitting judge is faced with a task, the repercussions of
which likely transcend anything he or she contemplated upon taking
the oath of office-the judge is wholly responsible for deciding the
fate of a person who is neither a child, nor an adult. Under the pres-
ent construction of the mature minor doctrine, the judge is guided in
his or her determination of maturity only by the requirement that the
minor refusing treatment understand and appreciate the consequences
of refusing treatment and that the minor exhibit the judgment of an
adult.178 This weak framework cannot support the weight of a deci-
sion that bears such grave consequences. It overlooks essential
questions.
On an abstract level, why would a person, who has lived less than
eighteen years, affirmatively choose to die? Practically, how should a
court assess the validity of an adolescent's reason(s) for refusing treat-
ment? How does the experience of living with chronic illness affect an
adolescent, psychologically and emotionally? Do adolescents respond
differently than adults to chronic illness? Is there a chance that a par-
ticular minor will outgrow his or her intolerance of illness and/or
treatment? This is but an abbreviated list of inquiries that the mature
minor doctrine does not currently provide for, but which must be con-
sidered before legally sanctioning an adolescent's refusal of life-saving
medical treatment. The answers to these questions require courts to
venture beyond the realm of legal doctrine, into the unfamiliar terri-
tory of the medical and psychological disciplines. Specifically, because
a minor's illness touches every part of his or her life, the mature minor
doctrine must take into account the unique psychological, emotional,
and social experience of the chronically ill adolescent.179
178. See supra text accompanying notes 95, 122-23, 142, 160.
179. See Jan van Eys, The Normally Sick Child, in THE NORMALLY SICK CHILD 11, 11 (Jan
van Eys ed., 1979) ("A child who is ill is not simply the sum of well child plus disease. The sick
child is a total entity that must be approached as such.").
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D. The Unique Experience of the Chronically Ill Adolescent
Chronic illness may be defined as "any condition, congenital or ac-
quired, that alters expected physical growth and development and re-
quires extended or sequential services. ' 180 While one in four youths
may have a chronic health condition, 181 the condition of a majority of
these youths will not cause great dysfunction or require extraordinary
medical care.'8 2 However, there are many conditions that are not
only onerous, but destructive of the health and welfare of the youths
they afflict.' 83 The effects of chronic illness on adolescent develop-
ment are numerous. 184 Moreover, chronic illness generates psycho-
logical repercussions distinguishable from other childhood traumas
because of the constancy of the illness, the demands of treatment, and
the likelihood of an early death. 185
180. Richard P. Nelson, Political and Financial Issues that Affect the Chronically Ill Adoles-
cent, in CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITIES IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 1, 1 (Robert
Win. Blum ed., 1984). Chronic conditions are typically not curable by short-interval treatment.
Id. at 4.
This Comment addresses the experience of the chronically ill adolescent, and not that of the
terminally ill adolescent. Terminal illness is "an incurable and irreversible condition that, with-
out the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending physician,
result in death within a relatively short time." 1989 UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL
ACT.
181. Nelson, supra note 180, at 2.
182. Id. Allergic disease, for example, is a relatively minor chronic health condition. Id.
183. Id.; see also Christine Harrison, Caring for the Chronically Ill Child, 3 CALYX 1, 1 (1993)
(stating that illness can have terrible and long-lasting effects on the developing minor since his or
her self-image is influenced by the way others view the illness, and the minor may feel uncer-
tainty about the future and doubt over whether he or she will ever be happy); cf. Mario Cappelli
et al., Chronic Disease and Its Impact: The Adolescent's Perspective, 10 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
CARE 283, 283 (1989) (noting that according to epidemiological studies, chronically ill children
and adolescents are more likely than their healthy counterparts to develop major psychosocial
problems). But see Robert N. Jamison et al., Cooperation with Treatment in Adolescent Cancer
Patients, 7 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 162, 165 (1986) (finding, in a comparative study of
older and younger adolescent cancer patients, that although older adolescent cancer patients
were less cooperative with regard to their health care, their lack of cooperation was manifest by
avoiding interaction with staff and other patients rather than missing clinic appointments or re-
sisting procedures).
184. Researchers have found that chronic illness (and organ transplantation in particular) may
potentially impact the achievement of developmental tasks during adolescence in the following
ways: The task of independence may be expressed in risk-taking behavior; physical abnormali-
ties which lower self-esteem and increase emotional difficulties may compromise the task of
establishing a sense of personal identity; differentness may impair the task of identification with
peers; and the task of preparation for sexual roles may be delayed or alternatively acted out in
life-threatening ways. S. Sexson & J. Rubenow, Transplants in Children and Adolescents, in
PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 33, 35 table 4.1 (J. Craven & G.M. Rodin
eds., 1992).
185. NICHOLAS HOBBS ET AL., CHRONICALLY ILL CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 73 (1985).
Whether a child has hemophilia, diabetes, sickle cell anemia, or any of the other
chronic illnesses, the relentlessness of the disease and the continuing need for treat-
1192
1996] MISUSE OF MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE 1193
It should be noted that the psychosocial ramifications of chronic
illness for adolescent patients is a relatively new area of study.186 The
rapid progress in the treatment of childhood diseases that were fatal in
yesteryear has enabled very ill children to remain alive. 187 One exam-
ple of this phenomenon is in the area of pediatric cancer:
The concerns of oncologists have increasingly shifted from pallia-
tion and terminal care as was the case in the 1950's, to an increased
focus on the child and the family's psychological needs, including
such issues as long-term pain and anxiety control, compliance with
treatment regimens, chronic depressive reactions, and family system
problems. The chronicity of childhood cancer and its treatment
course have been intensified and the ultimate outcome has become
more ambiguous. In some instances the course of treatment regi-
men itself has become more noxious or life-threatening.1 88
The psychological costs of this prolongation of life require the atten-
tion of the health care community and can no longer be ignored by the
legal community. 189
It is the aim of this section to explore the adolescent's experience
with chronic illness as it relates to psychological, social and emotional
development and well-being, and to hypothesize as to how that infor-
mation might bear on an adolescent's refusal of life-saving medical
treatment. First, this section discusses some of the general develop-
mental problems that chronically ill adolescents face. Next, it exam-
ines how adolescents suffer differently than other age groups from the
limitations imposed by chronic illness, as illustrated by studies of non-
ment necessarily limit activities, impose rigid routines of care, challenge a child's sense
of self-worth, and force entry into a frightening world of emergency rooms, hospital
corridors, and medical machines.
Id.
186. See Capelli et al., supra note 183, at 283 ("Although the literature is replete with studies
examining the effects of chronic disease on children, only recently has attention been turned to
the adolescent. Few studies have systematically investigated how adolescents view the impact of
their illness on their family, social, and personal well-being.") (citations omitted); see generally
Tracy R. Shaben, Psychosocial Issues in Kidney-Transplanted Children and Adolescents: Litera-
ture Review, 20 ANNA J. 663 (1993) (reviewing the literature from the 1960's to the present on
psychosocial issues in kidney-transplanted children and adolescents).
187. Gerald P. Koocher, Psychosocial Issues During the Acute Treatment of Pediatric Cancer,
58 CANCER 468, 468 (1986).
188. Id. (citations omitted); see also Michael J. Dolgin et al., Caregivers' Perceptions of Medi-
cal Compliance in Adolescents with Cancer, 7 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 22, 22 (1986)
("[A]dvances in the medical management of childhood and adolescent cancer have led to a shift
in psychosocial emphasis from death and bereavement to living with a chronic disease and its
treatment.").
189. See Koocher, supra note 187, at 472 ("As we strive for technical mastery over the dis-
eases that are cancer, we should be intensely concerned about the emotional welfare of our
patients and assure that human needs are fully addressed.").
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compliance with prescribed medical regimens by transplant and can-
cer patients.
1. Illness in the Teenage Years: Desperately Seeking Normalcy
Adolescence is a time of life unmatched by any other in terms of
emotional, psychological, and physical growth. 190 Adolescent devel-
opment is often accompanied by feelings of self-doubt and inadequacy
even for the healthiest individuals, 191 and chronic illness only exacer-
bates the adolescent's vulnerability in that he or she desperately wants
to look, feel and act "normal."'1 92 Compromising the child's course of
development into a "normal" teenager, chronic illness often forces
those it afflicts into an indefinite "sick role" by "the continuing need
to see physicians, take medication, receive treatment, and be aware of
any change in symptoms.' 93 Thus, chronically ill adolescents can
have skewed perceptions of themselves and their place in the world. 194
190. See Robert Win. Blum, The Dying Adolescent, in CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITIES IN
CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 159, 159 (Robert Wm. Blum ed., 1984) [hereinafter Blum, Dy-
ing Adolescent] ("Adolescence is a time measured by firsts-new experiences that bring the
developing teenager into contact with his or her emerging potential."); Jeanne Brooks-Gunn,
Why Do Adolescents Have Difficulty Adhering to Health Regimes?, in DEVELOPMENTAL AS-
PECTS OF HEALTH COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR 125, 125 (Norman A. Krasnegor et al. eds., 1993)
("Adolescence is a challenging time in that adolescents begin engaging in so-called adult behav-
iors and are confronted with a plethora of interwoven and complex issues, such as autonomy,
intimacy, and achievement."). Developmental tasks facing the adolescent include "adaptation to
sudden physical changes and preoccupation with physical appearance, the emergence of sexual-
ity, establishing a sense of personal identity and identification with a peer group, increasing
independence and separation from family, developing abstract reasoning skills and formal oper-
ational thought." WILLIAM T. GARRISON & SUSAN MCQUISTON, CHRONIC ILLNESS DURING
CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 67 (1989); see also supra note 184
(describing the ways in which the adolescent's achievement of four specific developmental tasks
may be compromised by chronic illness).
191. See HOBBS ET AL., supra note 185, at 72 ("Even with an intact, well-functioning body, it is
hard enough to negotiate the currents and challenges of adolescence.").
192. See Patrick Alvin, Adolescents with Long-Term Illness and Compliance: A Clinician's
Perspective, 13 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 372, 373 (1992) ("[Aldolescence, itself, tends to amplify
handicaps and differences from the 'norms.' For the child becoming an adolescent, the tolerance
to any disease, its stigmas and limitations, decreases.").
193. Nelson, supra note 180, at 4.
194. Numerous studies have isolated particular psychological, social, and emotional problems
experienced by adolescents living with chronic illness. See, e.g., Daniel Offer et al., Body Image,
Self-Perception, and Chronic Illness in Adolescence, in CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITIES IN
CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 59 (Robert Wm. Blum ed., 1984) (documenting the self-images
of groups of physically ill adolescents and comparing them with the self-images of nonpatient
teenagers); Warren M. Seigel et al., Depression, Self-Esteem, and Life Events in Adolescents with
Chronic Diseases, 11 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 501 (1990) (finding that adolescents with
chronic illness had higher depression scores and lower self-esteem than their healthy counter-
parts); Clara Wolman et al., Emotional Well-Being Among Adolescents with and Without Chronic
Conditions, 15 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 199 (1994) (comparing healthy adolescents with chroni-
cally ill adolescents and finding that the ill adolescents worried more about dying soon and about
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Despite the numerous forces conspiring to limit their options,
chronically ill teenagers have the same developmental needs as all
other youths.195 One important aspect of adolescent development
contemplates the formation of social and peer relations. Chronic ill-
ness hinders the successful achievement of such relations. Studies re-
veal that chronically ill adolescents "have fewer close friends, are less
likely to date, and are less likely to obtain their driver's license, even
when not precluded by their disability," 196 and that their illness "dis-
rupts their freedom and popularity.., and [they] are twice as likely to
report being unhappy." 197
Adolescents are also particularly concerned with how their peers
perceive them, and adolescents suffering from a chronic illness are
often faced with the anxiety-provoking situation of having to re-
integrate into peer groups after a prolonged hospitalization.1 98 As
one child has explained, justifying absence from school necessarily re-
quires disclosure of the illness, which can be an alienating
experience. 199
I don't try to tell them [friends] anymore. I'd have to get into what
it [cystic fibrosis] is doing to my body; they couldn't handle it. It
happened a lot before when I told people what was going on with
me; then they couldn't look or talk to me anymore.200
At the time when peer relationships are extremely important, friends
of chronically ill youths are constantly unsure of how close to be-
come.20 1 It is not unusual for chronically ill adolescents to experience
extreme feelings of loneliness and isolation,202 which, in turn, can
school or future work, had poorer body image, and scored lower on tests of emotional well-
being). But see Capelli et al., supra note 183 (finding no differences between the responses of
chronically ill adolescents and healthy adolescents on standardized measures of coping strate-
gies, mastery, self-efficacy, social support, and depression).
195. All adolescents "need opportunities to develop peer relationships and to experiment
with different personalities and styles." Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 173. Normal
developmental needs are rarely acknowledged by physicians who work with seriously ill youths,
leaving youths ill-informed and frustrated. Id. Areas of particular concern include life planning
and future goals, sexuality, the relationship between stress and illness, limits and risks of physical
exertion, and modification of medical regimens based on life style. Id.
196. Cappelli et al., supra note 183, at 284 (citations omitted).
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 172.
199. Id.
200. Id. (alteration in original).
201. Id. at 167.
202. Id. at 166; see also HoasS ET AL., supra note 185, at 79 ("The urge to cloister oneself can
be powerful, especially during adolescence. The presence of a chronic illness, regardless of its
degree of visibility, can deter socializing with friends and acquaintances."). Maturational dis-
crepancies (for example, those associated with Crohn's disease, end-stage renal failure or cystic
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hamper normal development and growth and even cause a physical
condition to deteriorate.203
Researchers find that the isolation felt by chronically ill adolescents
correlates to difficulty with what should be a natural shift of attention
from parents to peers. 204 At the time when their peers are all experi-
menting with independence, ill adolescents experience a prolonged
dependence on their parents, who have been, and most likely still are,
responsible for making sure their children adhere to their treatment
regimens. 20 5 It is not unusual for conflict to arise between chronically
ill adolescents and their parents over the "ownership" of the illness as
the adolescent begins to manage his or her own treatment regimen.206
One researcher has found that "parent-adolescent conflicts frequently
center on issues of parental infantilization of their teenage children
that disallows the new competencies of adolescence that the chroni-
cally ill teenager is striving to realize. ' 20 7 This parent-child "tug-of-
war" is just one facet of the chronically ill adolescent's struggle for
dominion over his or her world. Hospitalization or reliance on medi-
cal staff and the treatments they provide add to the adolescent's bat-
fibrosis) and frequent hospitalizations may magnify the adolescent's sad feelings. Blum, Dying
Adolescent, supra, at 165-66.
203. Adolescents are typically reluctant consumers of care. Nelson, supra note 180, at 7.
Health care professionals may approach their work assuming that they are providing to
an eager patient or client something that that person really wants, when in reality that
person does not want anything that professionals have to provide. Adolescents prefer
to use their time, energy, and resources for other pursuits. The need to pass, or to be
inconspicuous, often results in practices detrimental to health, such as eating inappro-
priate foods, suppressing a cough, or taking unwarranted risks.
Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 172.
204. See Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 167.
205. See id. (explaining that during childhood, "parents closely supervise drug regimens, spe-
cial diets, and physical therapy as if the disease were their own," and that "[t]he relationship
between parent and child during the first decade of life, coupled with the parents' feelings of
responsibility, makes the adolescent's transition from dependence through independence to in-
terdependence most difficult").
206. Id. at 172; cf. Robert L. Holmes, Children and Health Care Decisionmaking, in CMLDREN
AND HEALTH CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 173, 174 (Loretta M. Kopelman & John C.
Moskop eds., 1989).
The child ... during the teen years ... usually wants as much freedom as it can get.
And the common measure of its success in getting it is the extent to which it can chart a
different course from that wished for it by its parents. Thus responsible parents find
themselves caught in the middle, between guiding and supervising their children, on the
one hand, and letting them enjoy more freedom of choice, on the other.
Holmes, supra at 174.
207. Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 172; see also Dolgin et al., supra note 188, at
22 ("Parents may complicate matters by becoming over-protective-often as a means of combat-
ing their own feelings of fear and helplessness.").
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tle.208 In an attempt to regain control, some adolescents fail to comply
with their prescribed courses of therapy, which can result in acute re-
lapses or recurrent illnesses.209
Related to issues of control are the chronically ill adolescent's feel-
ings about, and responses to, the uncertainty of outcome inherent in
chronic illness.210 While most healthy teens are enthusiastic about fu-
ture prospects of independence, self-sufficiency and the experience of
forming new relationships, seriously ill adolescents may perceive their
future options as dependent on the status of their health condition.211
One researcher suggests that uncertainty about the future poses more
of an obstacle for the pediatric patient "whose developmental changes
are progressing at a more rapid pace, than for the adult patient who
has established basic life activity patterns. '212 Many chronically ill ad-
olescents have a distorted picture of the future, which may be attribu-
table to their arrested cognitive growth.213 Psychologists posit that
during adolescence there is a cognitive shift from concrete to abstract
reasoning,214 a component of which is the development of the ability
to draw upon old experiences to solve new problems. 215 This develop-
ing capacity is predicated upon the individual being exposed to multi-
ple new experiences.216 Because adolescents with chronic illness have
less opportunity to experiment than do their healthy peers, they "lack
the experiential substrate for healthy cognitive growth. '217
208. See Dolgin et al., supra note 188, at 22 ("The adolescent's sense of personal autonomy is
compromised by hospitalization and frequent clinic visits, which shift control over the adoles-
cent's life to the institution and its staff."); see also Jamison et al., supra note 183, at 166 (finding
adolescent cancer patients who believed that health professionals were not wholly responsible
for treatment and outcome to be more cooperative with treatment regimens).
209. Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 172-73. Blum posits that where adolescents
use their illness as a "weapon" by failing to comply with a prescribed therapeutic regimen, they
must view their illness as belonging more to others, such as their parents, than themselves. Id.
210. See Koocher, supra note 187, at 471 ("Uncertainty regarding the duration of the illness or
its ultimate outcome probably remains the greatest single psychological stressor facing the pa-
tient with a life-threatening illness.").
211. See Nelson, supra note 180, at 4 ("The arduous adolescent process of exploring limits,
reality testing, and self-image development may be severely delayed or compromised.").
212. Id.
213. Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 167-69.
214. Thinking abstractly awakens adolescents to their own ability to affect symptoms and re-
sults and allows them to understand the permanence of their illnesses and to think about the
future, early death, or increased incapacitation. Joan M. Patterson, Chronic Illness in Children
and the Impact on Families, in CImoNlC ILLNESS AND DisABaIrry 90 (Catherine S. Chilman et al.
eds., 1988).
215. Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 167.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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The behavioral patterns that emerge in response to uncertainty
about the future are varied. For example, adolescents may "exces-
sively structure every present moment to meet preconceived notions
of the future, ' 218 or alternatively, they may completely reject the pos-
sibility of experiencing future events,219 a form of denial which can
translate into present-moment gratification behavior.220 In one study,
it was found that chronically ill adolescents uniformly rejected discus-
sion of future events and exhibited hostility when the interviewer
asked about future goals.2 21 Some chronically ill adolescents begin to
write their wills during periods of hospitalization.22 2 This perhaps in-
dicates passive acceptance of a future marred by the realistic possibil-
ity of an early death. Other adolescents deal with the possibility of
early death more aggressively, possibly in an attempt to circumvent
what must feel like an eternal waiting game. One physician has re-
ported that nearly ten percent of the chronically ill adolescents seen in
the clinical program with which he is affiliated have attempted
suicide.223
The emotional experience of chronically ill adolescents-that they
may feel isolated, out of control, frustrated, depressed about the fu-
ture, and just plain "different"-may prompt some to refuse medical
treatment.224 To illustrate how these feelings translate into life-threat-
ening behavior, the following section focuses on recent research on
compliance patterns in adolescents.225
218. Id. at 168.
219. Patterson, supra note 214, at 88. Parents often contribute to their chronically ill adoles-
cent's denial of future events. See Alvin, supra note 192, at 373 ("[M]any parents have lived
under post-traumatic stress, having raised their sick child as 'different' from others. Some par-
ents have even never allowed themselves to think about any viable future project for their child,
including that of adolescence.").
220. Patterson, supra note 214, at 88. Patterson explains that denial is closely related to an
adolescent's noncompliance with prescribed treatment and that such risk-taking represents a
way for adolescents to challenge their own mortality. Id.
221. See R. Kastenbaum, Time and Death in Adolescence, in Tr MEANING OF DEATH (H.
Feifel ed., 1959) (finding that "[r]eferences to future events provoked resentment and anger in
adolescents who sense that theirs is not the future of their able-bodied peers.").
222. See HOBBS ET AL., supra note 185, at 75 (considering a chronically ill adolescent's writing
of his or her will "a reasonable, adultlike way of dealing with the fear of an impending death").
223. Alvin, supra note 192, at 373.
224. See infra part I.D.2. (exploring noncompliant behavior in chronically ill adolescents).
225. Again, research on compliance behavior that focuses specifically on adolescents is scant.
See Brooks-Gunn, supra note 190, at 129 ("It is believed that young adolescents exhibit less
health-promoting behaviors than do older individuals. Although literature from several sources
supports this contention, surprisingly little frank developmental research exists, in the sense of
making direct comparisons among children, younger adolescents, older adolescents, and young
adults.") (footnote omitted); Jamison et al., supra note 183, at 162 ("Although adolescents have
often been stereotyped as noncompliant, few studies have examined this issue."). Moreover, it
should be noted that many of the studies that have been published have been inconclusive and
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2. Compliance Behavior Among Chronically Ill Adolescents
Research on compliance behavior is an important resource to draw
upon for analyzing why an adolescent might refuse life-saving medical
treatment. It is not uncommon for well-informed adolescents to re-
fuse treatment recommended by their physicians.22 6 The term "non-
compliance" describes "nonadherance (or partial nonadherance) to a
prescribed therapeutic or disease preventing regimen. ' 227 One re-
searcher has observed, "While twenty-five to fifty percent of the gen-
eral population fail to comply with one or another aspect of a
prescribed medical regimen .... compliance remains one of the most
poorly understood of health behaviors."2 28
Generally, causes for noncompliance include lack of understanding
of the diagnosis and treatment plan, denial of illness and conse-
quences, life style, desire to remain ill and dependent on others, and
low self-esteem. 229 Not every impetus behind noncompliant behavior
is easy to detect or define. Consider the observation of one physician,
practicing in adolescent medicine:
Another thing I have come to know is that some adolescents with
non- or hardly visible handicaps could experience much more emo-
tional pain than those with obvious physical signs or impair-
ments .... [T]he emotional aspects and the personal representations
of an illness can have little or nothing to do with its particular type
or clinical severity. In fact, they seem to heavily depend upon mul-
tiple factors most of which do not belong to the rational and logical
biomedical domain. Most of the adolescent's behaviors are condi-
sometimes conflicting. Id. The following section presents some of the studies which suggest that
compliance behavior among adolescents differs from that among older patients.
226. Tomas J. Silber, Ethical Considerations in the Care of the Chronically Ill Adolescent, in
CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITIES IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 17, 22 (Robert Wm.
Blum ed., 1984).
227. Andre N. Minuth, The Economic Load of the Noncompliant Patient: Must Society Pay
for the Shrew?, 16 ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 98, 98 (1992). The term "gross noncompliance" refers to
patient conduct such as missed appointments, treatment resistance or refusal, discontinuation of
treatment against medical advice, or failure to comply with follow-up requirements. Dolgin et
al., supra note 188, at 23.
228. Robert Wm. Blum, Compliance with Therapeutic Regimens Among Children and Youths,
in CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITIES IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE, 143 ,143 (Robert
Wm. Blum ed., 1984).
229. Minuth, supra note 227, at 98. An adolescent's refusal may also be a response to unbear-
able side effects of certain treatments. See GARRISON & MCQUISTON, supra note 190, at 69
(discussing cancer treatments and stating that "the immediate effects of ... radiation therapy,
chemotherapy, and surgery, may be increased pain, nausea, and disfigurement, and it is under-
standable that many children and adolescents would have difficulty seeing beyond these effects
to their potential long-term benefits"). Socio-economic status is another variable relevant to
predicting noncompliance. See Dolgin et al., supra note 188, at 25-26 (discussing possible expla-
nations for differing results between two studies of noncompliance among cancer patients).
1200 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1165
tioned by these factors, the understanding of which may be
complex.2 30
In short, adolescent compliance behavior is unpredictable. Therefore,
accurately assessing the maturity of a chronically ill adolescent who
has refused life-saving medical treatment seems to be a futile task. To
illustrate the phenomenon of noncompliance among adolescents and
how it may bear on the issue of maturity, the following discussion fo-
cuses on published studies of adolescent transplant recipients2 31 and
cancer patients232 conducted during the past two decades.2 33
In a 1978 study,2 34 Barbara M. Korsch et al. found that of eighty
child renal transplant patients, fourteen were noncompliant with their
immunosuppressant regimen.235 Thirteen of the noncompliant pa-
tients were adolescents.2 36 All of the patients understood the impor-
tance and action of the immunosuppressant medications and had been
warned that failure to take their medications regularly might cause
rejection and allograft loss. 237 The researchers identified two domi-
nant motivations for noncompliance: Adolescent girls resented the
cosmetic side effects of the steroid medication;238 "[o]ther patients ap-
peared to resent their dependence on the treatment and the medical
230. Alvin, supra note 192, at 373.
231. A kidney transplant recipient who is noncompliant with his or her immunosuppressant
regimen risks rejection of the organ, in which case, hemodialysis must be administered until
another kidney is transplanted. Susan D. Klein et al., Chronic Kidney Disease and Transplanta-
tion in Childhood and Adolescence, in CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITIES IN CHILDHOOD AND
ADOLESCENCE 429, 438 (1984). Noncompliance, therefore, does not necessarily precipitate
death in kidney transplant recipients. As Klein et al. explain, "Kidney transplantation is a thera-
peutic intervention designed both to save the individual's life and to enable him or her to experi-
ence a higher quality of life than with alternative therapies for end-stage renal disease." Id. at
439. Nonetheless, the patterns of behavior among these patients are instructive in delineating
the reasons why adolescents, as a distinct population of transplant recipients, may become
noncompliant with their prescribed therapeutic regimens.
232. Refusal of medical treatment by cancer patients will necessarily result in death. Chemo-
therapy, radiation therapy, and other aggressive treatments provide the patient's only path to
survival. Alan D. Blotcky et al., Psychosocial Characteristics of Adolescents Who Refuse Cancer
Treatment, 53 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 729, 729 (1985).
233. Compliance by adolescents with other chronic illnesses, such as epilepsy, diabetes, and
cystic fibrosis, also has been the subject of recent research. See, e.g., Cappelli et al., supra note
183; E. Chigier, Compliance in Adolescents with Epilepsy or Diabetes, 13 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 375 (1992); Ira M. Friedman et al., Compliance with Anticonvulsant Therapy by Epilep-
tic Youth, 7 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 12 (1986).
234. Barbara M. Korsch et al., Noncompliance in Children with Renal Transplants, 61 PEDIAT-
RiCS 872 (1978).
235. Id. at 873.
236. Id. at 872. The patients who were over the age of 12 were deemed adolescents for pur-
poses of this study. Id. at 873.
237. Id. at 874.
238. Id. Steroids and immunosuppressive drugs, both medications continually needed to pre-
vent kidney rejection, sometimes cause a cushingoid appearance, characterized by "an abnor-
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establishment and were in effect experimenting and testing to see
whether they could 'fool' the physicians, their parents, and the sys-
tem. '2 39 Korsch and her colleagues concluded that the experiences
related to the treatment of end-stage renal disease are particularly
stressful to adolescent patients, especially adolescent girls, and that
the combination of a vulnerable personality and renal failure occur-
ring during the critical period of adolescence leads to severe maladap-
tion and noncompliance.2 40
In another study of transplant recipients,241 Susan D. Klein et al.
similarly found adolescent patients to be particularly vulnerable to
emotional stress as compared with patients of other ages.242 In a
study of fifty-two chronically ill patients in a pediatric renal clinic,
ranging in age from eight to twenty,243 the adolescents in the study
accounted for forty-nine percent of the incidents of major emotional
problems among the sample.2 " Significantly, suicidal thinking, the
most severe reaction that was reported, occurred only among
adolescents. 245
The study revealed a discrepancy in emotional stability between ad-
olescent transplant recipients and recipients belonging to other age
groups. While subjective dissatisfaction with appearance was identi-
fied as a factor critical to the general adjustment of the adolescents,
appearance did not seem as important to older patients. 246 Further-
more, the study showed that transplanted adolescent females exper-
ienced less control over destiny, lower stability of identity, less
independence, greater preoccupation, less happiness, and lower self-
esteem.247 Older recipients did not exhibit these characteristics. 248
The Klein study also revealed compliance behavior by adolescents
to be markedly different from that by adults.249 For example, adult
transplant recipients with adverse symptoms were more likely to com-
mally round, or moon-shaped, face and a protruding abdomen." Klein et al., supra note 231, at
438.
239. Korsch et al., supra note 234, at 875.
240. Id. at 875-76.
241. Klein et al., supra note 231, at 429.
242. Id. at 440.
243. Fourteen of the subjects were age 16 or over, and 38 of the subjects were between the
ages of 8 and 15. Id. at 430.
244. Id. at 440.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 446. The researchers observed that a disease had greater significance for the ado-
lescent's overall adjustment once it had become visible. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. "In fact, older women seem to fare better psychologically than do older men over the
short term after transplantation." Id.
249. Id. at 449-52.
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ply with their prescribed medication regimen than those with no
symptoms. 250 Conversely, adolescents who were symptomatic missed
their medications more often,2 51 despite the fact that the possible con-
sequences of such behavior could be devastating.252 It was posited
that such behavior "may reflect denial, acting out, or self-destructive
motivations. 2 53 Klein and her colleagues concluded that adolescents
may be particularly vulnerable to what they termed the "vicious
circle":
[T]he late adolescent-young adult patients who are not taking their
medications appear at risk both psychologically and physically.
They are not feeling well, they are generally unhappy and specifi-
cally unhappy with their appearance, they seem to think less highly
of themselves, and they tend to be female. This problem of non-
compliance may be particularly difficult to solve because of interde-
pendence of these factors; i.e., the medications tend to create
appearance problems and unhappiness, but without them the pa-
tient will not be able to maintain health.2 54
Studies of adolescent cancer patients also provide insight into the
compliance behavior of chronically ill adolescents.2 55 In a study of ten
adolescents who refused cancer treatment over a two-year period,2 56
Alan D. Blotcky et al. found discrete personality factors which
seemed to contribute to the refusal.2 57 These included anxiety levels,
sense of external control (i.e. belief that one's life is controlled by
luck, God, etc.), hopelessness, family satisfaction, religiosity, and phy-
sician satisfaction.2 58 Blotcky and his colleagues also found that the
adolescents' primary reasons for refusing treatment included the fear
of how they would look, fear of friends' reactions, side effects of treat-
ment, and painful medical procedures.2 59 The refusers reported that
their illness was beyond the control of themselves or their physician,
250. Id. at 450.
251. Id.
252. See id. ("Although we cannot untangle the direction of causal relationships here, it ap-
pears that the noncompliant patients within this age cohort may actually be making themselves
sicker.").
253. Id.
254. Id. at 452.
255. See, e.g., Dolgin et al., supra note 188 (conducting two studies to assess the scope and
determinants of gross noncompliance in adolescent cancer patients); Jamison et al., supra note
183 (identifying factors that relate to an adolescent's cooperation with cancer treatment, using a
nurse-rated cooperation scale).
256. Blotcky et al., supra note 232.
257. Id. at 730.
258. Id.
259. Id.; see also Dolgin et al., supra note 188, at 25 (finding, in one of two studies of gross
noncompliance in adolescent cancer patients, that "[p]rognosis at diagnosis, severity of side ef-
fects, and obvious physical residua were significantly related to noncompliance").
1202
MISUSE OF MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
and that their lives were determined by luck, fate, or religious convic-
tions.260 Furthermore, by discontinuing the treatment, the refusers
ceased suffering the side effects of chemotherapy and thus, tended to
believe that their disease was "getting better" or "not changing," and
that their chances of cure were still "excellent" or "good." 261
In addition to "feeling better" or asymptomatic, refusers of chemo-
therapy may believe that they are successfully avoiding unpleasant
long-term physical effects that some radiation treatments may pro-
duce. Certain types of cancer treatment can cause sterility, growth
retardation or cognitive disabilities, which may have long-enduring
psychological ramifications. 262 One researcher has identified several
specific psychological disorders related to cancer treatment. First, a
chronically suppressed immune system may result in anxiety over po-
tential infections or "germ phobias. '263 Second, chemotherapy-re-
lated delayed puberty in adolescent female patients can cause poor
self-esteem. 264 Third, adolescent concern over sterility can lead to
depression.265
In sum, there exist numerous factors unique to adolescents that con-
tribute to noncompliance with treatment regimens. In light of the re-
search suggesting that adolescents may respond differently than adults
to chronic illness, the question thus becomes, is it a legitimate exercise
of judicial authority to sanction an adolescent's refusal of life-saving
medical treatment pursuant to the mature minor doctrine?
II. ANALYSIS
The mature minor doctrine has skewed the bright-line rule that
adults may legally refuse medical treatment and minors may not. For
all practical purposes, the doctrine allows some minors to make deci-
260. Blotcky et al., supra note 232, at 731. This belief may protect patients from experiencing
severe anxiety. Koocher, supra note 187, at 471. Other studies show that most adolescent cancer
patients cope with the stress of their illness through adaptive denial or intellectual defense mech-
anisms. See, e.g., GERALD P. KOOCHER & J.E. O'MALLEY, THE DAMOCLES SYNDROME:
PSYCHOSOCIAL CONSEOUENCES OF SURVIVING CHILDHOOD CANCER (1981); S.B. Lansky et al.,
Refusal of Treatment: A New Dilemma for Oncologists, 1 AM. J. PEDIATRIC HEMATOLOGY/
ONCOLOGY 277 (1979).
261. Blotcky et al., supra note 232, at 730. Nausea and vomiting are the most common side
effects of chemotherapy. Koocher, supra note 187, at 469.
262. Koocher, supra note 187, at 469; see also Dolgin et al., supra note 188, at 22-23 (explain-
ing that diagnosis and treatment of serious illness during adolescence may cause physical weak-
ness, dependence on others, and disruption of peer relations; it may inhibit psychosocial and
psychosexual development; and it may compromise the adolescent's sense of personal
autonomy).
263. Koocher, supra note 187, at 469.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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sions for themselves when they engage in adult-like activities that
would ordinarily be reserved to their parents.2 66 In recent years, the
law has gone so far as to allow mature minors to refuse medical treat-
ment without which they were destined to meet an imminent death.2 67
While the age eighteen does not necessarily accurately reflect the time
when all adolescents achieve the mental and emotional aptitude to
make adult-like decisions, there is something disconcerting about
placing a life or death decision into the hands of a fifteen-year-old
such as Benny Agrelo,2 68 even if it is his own life at stake.
The logical justification for employing the mature minor doctrine
would seem to be judicial recognition that it is possible for some ado-
lescents to attain the faculty for adult-like decision-making, in con-
junction with psychosocial documentation that those adolescents do,
in fact, exercise adult-like judgment regarding their health care. In
other words, the mature minor doctrine should be the legal system's
way of expressing that anyone who exhibits the maturity of an adult
ought to enjoy the same substantive rights that an adult enjoys while
engaging in adult-like activity. Once a determination of maturity is
made, the adolescent ought to be free to make whatever decisions he
or she deems appropriate, without parental or state interference, and
indifferent to judicial notions of what is in the adolescent's "best
interests."
A close examination of the mature minor doctrine's evolution
reveals that the purposes sought to be served by removing the paren-
tal consent barrier to certain forms of medical treatment for adoles-
cents reflect a more paternalistic objective by the courts. Instead of
affording adolescents a right to access for the sake of expanding their
rights in the health care context, courts have extended the right to
access where it is in adolescents' best interests to do so. The minor is
never free from an inquiry as to what is in his or her best interests.
Courts will not even embark on a maturity evaluation unless a finding
of maturity will in some way serve the best interests of the minor.2 69
Thus, the initial inquiry must be whether it is ever in the best interests
of an adolescent to refuse necessary medical treatment. If the answer
266. See supra part I.B.4. (tracing the development of the mature minor doctrine).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17 (discussing the case of Benny Agrelo, in which
a trial court judge most likely invoked the mature minor doctrine to allow a 15-year-old liver
transplant pattient to discontinue anti-rejection medication); supra notes 130-47 and accompany-
ing text (discussing In re E.G., in which a minor suffering from leukemia was permitted to refuse
blood transfusions that were part of treatment to save her life).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17 (discussing the case of Benny Agrelo).
269. See infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text (discussing the emergency exception to the
common law rule requiring parental consent, minor treatment statutes, and abortion laws).
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is "no," then courts would never even have to assess maturity. If,
however, it is determined that under certain circumstances it is in the
best interests of adolescents to forego necessary medical treatment,
then courts would need to indulge in a maturity evaluation when
presented with adolescents who refuse medical treatment.
As the following discussion will show, both levels of evaluation are
problematic. First, determining whether allowing adolescents to re-
fuse life-saving medical treatment is in their best interests necessarily
requires that there exist a mode of analysis for defining what those
interests are in such a situation. Although the mature minor doctrine
recognizes that minors' personal interests warrant respect, courts have
ordinarily analyzed those interests in an "unsystematic and unfocused
fashion. '270 Moreover, an ancillary consequence of inquiring into ad-
olescents' best interests is that such inquiry effectively undermines ad-
olescents' interest in personal autonomy.271 Second, the vagueness
and malleability of the current formulation of the mature minor doc-
trine make judicial assessments of maturity suspect.272
To better understand the complexities of the interrelationship be-
tween maturity inquiries and best interest determinations, the first
section of the Analysis traces the development of minors' limited
rights to consent to and refuse medical care as a manifestation of pa-
ternalism. Particularly noteworthy are judicial reluctance to extend to
minors any consensual authority where proposed medical treatment is
not beneficial and the persistence of the notion that parents are ap-
propriate adjudicators of their children's best interests. The second
section of the Analysis focuses on the validity of the mature minor
doctrine in light of its potential for misapplication.
A. The Paternalism Concept
Paternalism is at the heart of all legal policies governing allocation
of consensual rights in the health care context.273 The common law
270. Stuart J. Baskin, Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1383, 1392 (1974).
271. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1592 ("If paternalism is the prevailing policy in this con-
text, the argument for minors' increased autonomy becomes weaker when the decision involves
refusal of, rather than consent to, medical treatment."). However, assessing the best interests of
a chronically ill adolescent must take into consideration the individual's personal suffering that
would result by being forced to endure unbearable side effects of treatment until turning
eighteen.
272. See infra part II.B.
273. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1587 ("A single policy emerges from both the requirement
for parental consent and the associated situational and status exceptions: paternalism.").
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rules requiring parental consent for the treatment of minors,274 and
their exceptions, 275 further paternalistic goals by allocating decision-
making capacity in a way that yields maximum benefit not only to the
specific minor whose treatment is at issue, but to the general public as
well. For example, exceptions to the common law rule under emer-
gency circumstances were premised on the idea that it is always in the
best interests of a child to receive prompt medical attention when his
or her health or life is endangered.276 Similarly, minor treatment stat-
utes were enacted in response to society's fear that minors would
rather suffer from sexually transmitted diseases, alcohol and substance
abuse, and mental disorders than risk the consequences of consulting
their parents, who may be angry, accusative, or unsupportive.277 Fi-
nally, in the abortion context, it was feared that if minors were denied
access to legal abortions, they would alternatively seek potentially
harmful illegal abortions.27 8 One commentator has observed:
Despite a plethora of cases which purport to turn on minors' matur-
ity, the case law granting reproductive rights to minors, like the ma-
ture minor doctrine generally, rests not on an assessment of
maturity, but rather, on a calculus which permits minors autonomy
only when the treatment is relatively low risk, or when denying ac-
cess may cause the minor to suffer permanent harm.279
As another commentator has posited that affording minors access to
abortions and contraceptives fulfills the government's obligation "to
do less harm than good. '280
That the state's interests in preservation of life and protection of
minors' health are the paramount objectives in allocating to adoles-
cents any degree of consensual authority over their health care is sup-
ported by the fact that mature minors traditionally have been
permitted to consent to their own medical treatment only where the
274. See supra part I.B.1. (discussing the common law position that until reaching the age of
majority, a minor lacks legal authority to consent to his or her own medical care).
275. See supra parts I.B.2.-3. (discussing the common law emergency and emancipation excep-
tions and minor treatment statutes).
276. See supra text accompanying note 66 (explaining the law's recognition that it is cruel to
allow a child to suffer in an emergency merely because he is unaccompanied by his or her
parents).
277. See supra part I.B.3. (discussing the development of minor treatment statutes); see also
ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 65 (explaining that "[t]o seek parental approval for treatment of these
conditions is to inform parents of underlying patterns of behavior that are not likely to inspire
parental approval.").
278. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 1607-08 (observing that the "'best interests' rationale ap-
plies ... in the context of abortion, where requiring parental consent might prompt minors to
seek unsafe, illegal abortions out of fear (however ill-founded) and desperation").
279. Oberman, supra note 56, at 52.
280. ZIMRiNG, supra note 1, at 66.
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treatment was for their benefit. 281 "Benefit" translates to curative or
therapeutic treatment.28 2 State intervention policies similarly exem-
plify society's interest in affording minors beneficial treatment. 283 In
the case of a young minor, for example, the state is not entitled to
interfere with parents' decisions to refuse medical treatment on behalf
of their child.2 4 However, the state has full discretion to intervene
when the refused treatment is necessary to save the minor's life.28 5
Parents are the traditional adjudicators of their children's best inter-
ests. The mature minor doctrine should, in theory, effectively usurp
parents' authority over health care decisions affecting their children.
However, it is often difficult to divorce the minors' interests from the
parents' interests. In the context of abortion, the Court in Danforth
held that the rights of parents must yield to the fundamental rights of
their children. 286 However, this is not an absolute right of minors to
be free from the intrusion of their parents into their decision to have
an abortion. Rather, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit has noted that "even though a parent has an interest in
the decision whether the minor is to have an abortion, the state has
the power and duty to exclude the parent from the decision-making
process if it is determined that exclusion would better serve the minor's
welfare.'' 287 The pregnant adolescent must still go to court and
demonstrate either that she is mature or that it is in her best interests
281. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (defining the mature minor doctrine). It has
been observed that in most consent to treatment cases in which the mature minor doctrine has
been invoked, the medical procedures involved have been less than "serious." ZiMRIrNG, supra
note 1, at 66.
282. See MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 17 ("[I]t is clear that where the courts have
viewed minors as mature enough to consent to medical treatment, the procedures involved have
been relatively uncomplicated and have been recommended for the minor's own benefit.").
283. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52 (discussing state intervention policies).
284. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115-20 (Del. 1991) (sustaining parental
objection to chemotherapy where the treatment was "more likely to fail than succeed" and could
be fatal in itself).
285. See MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 96 (noting that all states consider "the withhold-
ing of necessary medical treatment from a child to constitute abuse and/or neglect").
286. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71-76 (1976). In Wynn v.
Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted
Danforth as standing for the following proposition:
Because it is the minor, not the parents, who physically bears the child and faces the
physiological and emotional risks attendant to childbirth, and because it is the minor,
not the parents, who is responsible for the child once it is born, the Court held that
parents do not have the right to stop an abortion if their mature daughter, with the
consent of her physician, decides to terminate the pregnancy.
Id. at 1386.
287. Wynn, 582 F.2d at 1386 (emphasis added).
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to refrain from involving her parents in her decision to have an
abortion.
In the context of an adolescent refusing necessary medical treat-
ment, courts have yet to honor a minor's refusal over the objections of
his or her parents. For example, in In re E.G.,288 although the court
framed its decision to accept E.G.'s refusal of blood transfusions in
terms of the minor's interest in self-determination and not her par-
ents' interest in autonomy from the state, E.G.'s parents did not ob-
ject to her refusal.289 In one commentator's opinion, "where the
child's life is at stake, a conflict between the parents and the child
should be resolved in favor of preservation of the child's life, even if
treatment is given over the child's objection. '290
Considering the development of minor abortion law,291 the align-
ment of parent and child interests in In re E.G.,292 and the Supreme
Court's consistent reiteration of the "natural rights" of parents to
raise their children in the manner they see fit, 293 one is inclined to
believe that only where parents concur with their minor child's refusal
of life-saving medical treatment will a court consider giving legal ef-
fect to the minor's wishes. Thus, in addition to conducting a best in-
terests inquiry-which lacks any substantive guidelines-courts must
at some point take into account the alignment between the parents'
and the minor's desires. This clearly undermines the utility of declar-
ing a particular minor to be mature enough to make a personal choice
regarding his or her health care.
Finally, the psychosocial experience of the chronically ill adolescent
should not be overlooked as a significant variable in the best interests
analysis. Research indicates that adolescents manifest an intolerance
for both illness and its treatment that markedly exceeds that of simi-
larly ill adults.294 When the physical and emotional turmoil felt by a
chronically ill adolescent translates into noncompliant behavior, cer-
tain questions must be addressed: Will the adolescent feel better,
physically and/or emotionally, in a few months or few years? What if,
288. 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); see supra notes 130-47 and accompanying text (discussing E.G.
in detail).
289. E.G., 549 N.E. 2d at 326-28.
290. HOLDER, LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 6, at 122.
291. See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of minor abor-
tion law).
292. See supra text accompanying note 132 (noting that E.G.'s mother concurred with E.G.'s
refusal of medically necessary blood transfusions).
293. See supra notes 49, 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the right of parents to make
decisions regarding the care of their children).
294. See supra part I.D. (discussing psychosocial research concerning chronically ill
adolescents).
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in time, there is a less invasive, more tolerable treatment developed?
Most importantly, is it ever in the best interests of an adolescent to
forego the opportunity to grow up? Although there are no correct or
concrete answers to these questions, merely positing them highlights
that there are inherent problems with legally sanctioning an adoles-
cent's refusal of life-saving medical treatment, especially in light of the
courts' traditional protective posture towards minors.
Since serving the best interests of a minor is the primary goal in
making any decision regarding a minor's health, and because parents
maintain a judicially recognized interest in the care of their adolescent
children, invocation of the mature minor doctrine to allow an adoles-
cent to refuse life-saving medical treatment runs contrary to the tradi-
tional policies governing allocation of consensual authority in the
health care context.295 This undermines the legitimacy of using the
mature minor doctrine to afford adolescents the right to refuse life-
saving medical treatment. Nonetheless, assuming that such theoreti-
cal considerations are overlooked, there still exists the practical prob-
lem of creating an appropriate standard for determining maturity.
B. Definitional Shortcomings of the Mature Minor Doctrine
As a matter of analytical process, a minor who is found by a court to
be mature may legally refuse medical treatment by invoking a right
that is normally reserved for adults.296 The minor's refusal will be
honored so long as his or her interest in self-determination is not out-
weighed by one or a combination of four state interests.297 Thus, the
method by which a court assesses a minor's maturity will be outcome-
determinative of whether he or she may refuse life-saving treat-
ment.298 To illustrate the significance of the term "maturity," this sec-
tion first delineates how courts currently define "mature minor." It
then addresses the problems inherent in making a subjective assess-
295. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 329 (IIl. 1989) (Ward, J., dissenting) (explaining that E.G.
"is not a holding where consent to treatment is the question but rather a unique one where a
minor's injury or very self-destruction may be involved").
296. If a minor is found to be mature, the court is effectively declaring the minor to be an
adult for purposes of making a particular decision.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44 (discussing the "equation" the court used to
determine whether the adolescent in In re E.G. could legally refuse necessary blood transfu-
sions); see also supra text accompanying notes 31-33 (explaining that where an adult refuses life-
sustaining treatment, the court will balance the individual's interest in self-determination against
four countervailing state interests).
298. If a minor is found to be mature, his or her interest in self-determination will equal that
of an adult. It is rare that a court will find that a state interest outweighs an adult's interest in
self-determination, and thus, it logically follows that no state interest should outweigh a mature
minor's interest in self-determination.
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ment of a minor's maturity. Finally, it explores the necessity of incor-
porating information regarding the psychosocial development and
compliance behavior of chronically ill adolescents into a working defi-
nition of "maturity."
1. Present Interpretation of the Mature Minor Doctrine
Caselaw yields little guidance as to what constitutes maturity for
purposes of declaring an adolescent a mature minor. In the caselaw to
date, the issue of a minor's maturity receives little more than a brief
reference, and often, the court will simply cite several factors that it or
another court considered relevant in previous cases, without actually
applying the factors to the facts of the instant case. Although a syn-
thesis of the courts' analyses of maturity in the cases discussed in the
Background section provides a laundry list of what may be "recom-
mended" factors to consider in assessing maturity, 299 the traits and
circumstances they appraise are not dispositive of maturity. At pres-
ent, it is recommended that courts consider the following to determine
whether a minor is mature: the minor's age,300 judgment,301 educa-
tion,302 training,303 ability, 304 and experience; 305 the minor's conduct
and demeanor at the time of treatment;30 6 whether the minor exhibits
the maturity of an eighteen to twenty-one-year-old; 30 7 whether the mi-
nor understands the basic tenets of his or her religion if religion is the
basis of the refusal;308 whether the minor is well enough informed to
make an intelligent decision;309 whether the minor has the capacity to
appreciate the risks of the medical procedure administered or with-
held;310 and whether the minor can assess the implications of his or
her choice.31'
While these factors may provide some insight into whether or not a
minor understands the nature of his or her ailment and the possible
299. See supra parts I.B.4., I.C. (discussing cases in which the mature minor doctrine has been
invoked in the health care context).
300. Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992).
301. Id.; In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (I11. 1989); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 755
(Tenn. 1987).
302. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 755; Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 838.
303. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 755; Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 838.
304. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 755; Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 838.
305. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 838.
306. Id.
307. E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
308. In re Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
309. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).
310. Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992).
311. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 650.
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consequences of refusing treatment, they are vague and incapable of
yielding an accurate assessment of maturity where the minor under
consideration is a chronically ill adolescent. For example, a chroni-
cally ill sixteen-year-old can certainly explain to a judge that she
knows she will die if she stops her chemotherapy, but that death is
preferable to the dreadful side effects of treatment. She may be well-
educated and maintain adult-like composure throughout her treat-
ment. Under the current standards for assessing maturity, this partic-
ular adolescent may qualify as "mature," which means the law will
treat her as having the capacity of a similarly situated adult to make a
life or death decision. The problem is that although she may look,
talk, and act like an adult, she is an adolescent, and adolescents re-
spond differently to chronic illness than adults. 312 Chronically ill ado-
lescents and chronically ill adults are not similarly situated in terms of
their emotional and psychological development and coping.313 Under
the current standards for determining maturity, this concept is ig-
nored. Thus, the minor's life is left entirely to the discretion of a sin-
gle judge.
2. Judicial Discretion
The lack of any meaningful guidance by way of legislation or legal
precedent as to how a judge might go about assessing a minor's matur-
ity creates the potential for unchecked judicial discretion and inconsis-
tent application of an ill-defined standard. The standards by which a
judge will decide the fate of a minor are ultimately the judge's own
values. 314 Furthermore, it is unlikely that a judge will have the time
necessary to fully evaluate every component of the minor's specific
situation.315 It is unclear the amount and types of information about
312. See supra parts I.D.1.-2. (discussing research on adolescents' response to chronic illness).
313. Id. Perhaps the differences in coping ability between adolescents and adults are not sig-
nificant enough to justify disparate treatment of them. Although comparative research of the
two age groups is not yet well-developed and the extent of these differences is unclear, there is
no conclusive evidence that chronically ill adolescents and adults respond to their illnesses in the
same way. Therefore, it is not appropriate for the law to presume that because a minor exhibits
characteristics of "maturity" unrelated to his or her illness that he or she is as mature as an adult
in all relevant respects.
314. Waters, supra note 112, at 92. Waters argues that "the Court must elaborate upon the
mature-minor standard to ensure that a minor's right to an abortion is not obscured by a veil of
judicial discretion." Id.
315. See id. at 98 n.55
For the judge to have intimate knowledge of the person before the court, he must re-
view files and reports, consult with relevant medical and counseling professionals, and
spend time with the teenager .... [I]t is likely unfeasible for a judge to acquire the
needed familiarity with the teenager and her situation.
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the minor a judge is required to collect before he or she is able to
make an informed assessment of maturity.
Vague standards for assessing maturity also invite determinations
based upon characteristics that may be the "fortuitous product of edu-
cational opportunity and socioeconomic advantage," 316 and thus cre-
ate the potential for discrimination. For example, two sixteen-year-
olds, each experiencing the same acute treatment for the identical
form of cancer, may be dealt with quite differently depending upon
their respective physical appearances, their dispositions while talking
to the judge, and their abilities to articulate their feelings. 317
This is not to suggest that an objective test for maturity, such as an
age-based standard which would allow a seventeen-year-old to refuse
treatment, but would bar a fifteen-year-old from even petitioning the
court for an assessment of his or her maturity, is preferable to a sub-
jective evaluation.318 Age-based standards of maturity are no less
arbitrary than the standards that are presently in place.319 Rather, the
primary problem with the current method of evaluation of maturity is
that it is devoid of any substantive inquiry into the psychosocial
ramifications of chronic illness during adolescence that may precipi-
tate an adolescent's refusal of life-saving medical treatment.
3. The Experience of the Chronically Ill Adolescent as a Factor in
Assessing Maturity
Incorporating available information regarding the impact of chronic
illness on the emotional stability of an adolescent is an integral part of
creating a working definition of "mature minor" in the health care
context, especially where an adolescent is refusing medical care neces-
sary to sustain his or her life. Moreover, because the mature minor
doctrine is a vehicle through which to promote the "best interests" of
316. Id. at 99.
317. See id. (explaining that "[e]qual and consistent treatment of similarly situated minors
may be impossible if the general procedures or inquiries for determining maturity are left to ad
hoc decision making and excessive judicial discretion").
318. See id. at 100 (observing the following in the context of abortion:
Objective standards, such as age or physical attributes, reveal only the most general
aspects of a teenager's status and are too dependent on the superficial aspects of chro-
nology or physiology to assess adequately an individual's capacity to rationally consider
and comprehend the short- and long-term consequences of aborting or continuing a
pregnancy.).
For a discussion of proposed objective diagnosis-based standards for assessing maturity, see gen-
erally Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 300-11 (reciting the factors that currently guide courts
in assessing maturity).
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minors,32 0 it does not seem possible to make a sound life or death
decision without considering whether there are specific characteristics
that distinguish a seriously ill adolescent from a similarly ill adult, and
which may influence an adolescent's compliance behavior.
An adolescent's apparent ability to comprehend that death will be
the inevitable consequence of discontinuing life-saving medical treat-
ment should not be the most weighty factor in determining that a mi-
nor is mature. Explicit acceptance of death as an alternative to
continuing medical treatment should likewise not be considered dis-
positive of a minor's maturity. Current literature regarding the
psychosocial ramifications of chronic illness suggests that adolescents
are particularly susceptible to "intolerance. ' 321 This intolerance en-
compasses the physical, emotional, and psychological suffering caused
by the adolescent's illness and treatments.322 Because certain mani-
festations of intolerance are unique to the adolescent age group,323
they may be considered temporary, in which case the risk of making
an erroneous decision to discontinue or refuse necessary medical
treatment greatly increases.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,324 the Court
was clearly bothered by the risk of error that is inherent in choosing to
terminate life-sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent
adult.325 In light of the traditional protective posture of courts regard-
ing the medical care of minors326 and the possibility that a minor will
outgrow the intolerance for his or her illness and/or treatment, it
would seem that the courts would be equally, if not more, reluctant to
allow a mentally competent minor to refuse medical treatment neces-
sary to sustain his or her life.
Intolerance bears on maturity in a variety of ways. Educational
psychologists measure the components of an adolescent's maturity,
which include his or her relative emotional, psychological, and social
growth, through "developmental tasks. ' 327 One commentator has
noted the following:
320. See supra part II.A. (discussing the paternalistic objectives of mature minor law).
321. See supra parts I.D.1.-2. (discussing ways in which the emotional effects of chronic illness
and its treatment translate into behavior patterns among adolescents).
322. See supra parts I.D.1.-2.
323. See supra parts I.D.1.-2.
324. 497 U.S. 261 (1989).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
326. See supra part 1.B.1. (discussing common law rules which allocate to parents the author-
ity to consent to health care for their children).
327. Waters, supra note 112, at 101 n.62.
121319961
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The developmental tasks of adolescents include achieving more ma-
ture relationships with age-mates of both sexes, achieving emotional
independence from parents and other adults, selecting and prepar-
ing for an occupation, developing intellectual skills and concepts
necessary for civic competence, achieving socially responsible be-
havior, and acquiring a set of values and an ethical system as a guide
to behavior. 328
Against this criteria, arguably, chronically ill adolescents develop at a
slower rate than their healthy contemporaries. 329 Chronically ill ado-
lescents often isolate themselves from their peers, either because they
feel that their physical condition scares people away, or because they
spend too much time out of school, thus preventing them from build-
ing any significant relationships.330 At the same time, chronically ill
adolescents are more likely than healthy adolescents to remain depen-
dent on their parents.331 The combination of continued dependence
on parents and isolation from peers (even if it is self-imposed) creates
a rebellious effect in some adolescents, which may lead to self-destruc-
tive behavior, including noncompliance with medication or other
forms of treatment.332
The data on compliance behavior by chronically ill patients clearly
identify adolescents as the group most likely to become noncom-
pliant. 333 While researchers cite dissatisfaction with appearance, side
effects of treatment, and fear of friends' reactions as some of the most
significant factors leading to noncompliance, 334 these feelings may be
well-disguised by the adolescent.
Studies of compliance behavior in chronically ill adolescents are rel-
evant to legal analysis on two interrelated levels: First, the data iden-
tifies adolescents as a discreet subset of chronically ill patients335 that
requires particular attention by the medical, psychological, and legal
communities. Second, because the true underlying motivations for re-
fusing treatment could be difficult for a judge to identify (especially by
the current method of assessing maturity), it is imperative that the
328. Id.
329. See supra part ID.1. (discussing the aberrant social development of chronically ill
adolescents).
330. Blum, Dying Adolescent, supra note 190, at 167.
331. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text (describing the relationship between
chronically ill adolescents and their parents).
332. See supra part I.D.2. (discussing noncompliance with prescribed medical treatment
among chronically ill adolescents).
333. See supra part I.D.2.
334. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (discussing the results of several studies of
adolescent patients refusing treatment for cancer) and notes 238, 246, 251, 254 (discussing the
results of two studies of adolescent patients refusing treatment for kidney disease).
335. See supra parts I.D.1.-2.
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legal system construct a mode of analysis for determining maturity
that accounts for the unique response by adolescents to the experi-
ence of chronic illness, as illustrated by their compliance behavior.
III. CONCLUSION
As medical technology continues to progress at unprecedented
rates, it is likely that state agencies will, in the future, present to the
various courts throughout the nation situations akin to that of Benny
Agrelo. The courts must prepare themselves to make such life or
death decisions and must base their decisions on rational legal doc-
trine. In theory, the mature minor doctrine provides a court with the
greatest ability to take account of all factors relevant to deciding
whether to legally sanction an adolescent's decision to forego life-sav-
ing medical treatment. 336 Despite its apparent flexibility, the doctrine,
as applied in this context, suffers from two fundamental flaws: Its
vagueness invites inconsistency in application,337 and it fails to recog-
nize the uniqueness of the population affected.338 Furthermore, a re-
view of the evolution of minors' legal ability to consent to certain
forms of health care reveals an underlying paternalistic objective,
which is significant in that it requires courts to evaluate and identify
what course of action would be in the best interests of the refusing
adolescent. Not only does such an inquiry involve unjustified subjec-
tivity, but it effectively undermines the premise upon which the doc-
trine is based-that some minors are mature enough to make their
own decisions, regardless of whether their parents, their doctors, or
the courts concur.
That courts have deviated from the common law position regarding
minors as incapable of making reasoned, adult-like decisions, to allow
them to refuse life-saving medical treatment, merits scrutiny. The am-
biguity in prohibiting minors from purchasing alcoholic beverages, cig-
arettes or pornographic magazines, but allowing them to refuse life-
saving medical treatment speaks for itself. Perhaps there exists some
justification for the dichotomy, but the courts have yet to articulate it.
336. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (introducing the mature minor doctrine as
a loosely defined and malleable legal tool).
337. See supra part II.B.2. (explaining that the lack of uniform standards by which to assess a
minor's maturity inevitably invites judicial discretion, which leads to inconsistent outcomes
among cases).
338. See supra part II.B.3. (arguing that in the context of adolescents who refuse life-saving
medical treatment, the mature minor doctrine, as currently interpreted, is an incomplete method
of determining maturity, as it does not take into account differences between adolescents and
adults in terms of their ability to cope with chronic illness).
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It is unacceptable that these issues are yet unaddressed by the legal
community, for one must remember that relatively young lives are at
stake. The medical, psychological, sociological, as well as legal com-
plexities involved in cases of adolescents refusing life-saving medical
treatment cannot easily be untangled. Nonetheless, the gravity of the
consequences of continuing to apply the mature minor standard, de-
spite its shortcomings, demands that courts tackle this area of the law.
Acknowledging the adolescent's atypical experience with chronic ill-
ness represents the first, and most essential, step.
Jessica A. Penkower*
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